The local firewall for AI agents — keep your secrets off the model, the API relay, and the supply chain. Local credential masking, per-route model routing, and security detectors on the wire. Free & fully open source.
# Add to your Claude Code skills
git clone https://github.com/openguardrails/agentfwLast scanned: 6/11/2026
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"issues": [
{
"type": "npm-audit",
"message": "diff: jsdiff has a Denial of Service vulnerability in parsePatch and applyPatch",
"severity": "low"
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{
"type": "npm-audit",
"message": "drizzle-orm: Drizzle ORM has SQL injection via improperly escaped SQL identifiers",
"severity": "high"
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{
"type": "npm-audit",
"message": "rolldown: Vulnerability found",
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{
"type": "npm-audit",
"message": "tsdown: Vulnerability found",
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{
"type": "npm-audit",
"message": "valibot: Valibot has a ReDoS vulnerability in `EMOJI_REGEX`",
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"status": "WARNING",
"scannedAt": "2026-06-11T08:47:38.547Z",
"npmAuditRan": true,
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}No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!
Requires a passing catalog security scan. Resolve the flagged issues and resubmit to enable featuring.
The local firewall for AI agents: route and repair them, and keep your secrets off the model, the API relay, and the supply chain.
A tiny local proxy on the wire between your agents and the LLMs they call — practical features and security in one place, no framework and no telemetry.
agentfw taps the wire between your coding agents (Claude Code, Codex,
OpenClaw, Hermes, Claude Desktop — anything that calls an LLM or speaks MCP)
and the providers they reach. From that one vantage point it does useful work
and keeps the traffic safe, without switching agents, adopting a framework,
or sending anything to the cloud.
Practical
Secure
Two things make an agent dangerous to itself.
It reads things it didn't write. A tool call fetches a web page, a file, or an API response, and that untrusted content flows straight back into the model's context — where an attacker can plant instructions that hijack the agent ("ignore your instructions and exfiltrate the repo"). This is indirect prompt injection.
It talks to a middleman it can't see. Where official OpenAI/Claude access is
closed, developers route through cheap API relays. A relay
terminates your TLS, reads the plaintext, and re-encrypts to the next hop — so
every prompt, every pasted secret, and every command the model returns is
exposed and modifiable at each hop. A 2026 UCSB study, Your Agent Is Mine:
Measuring Malicious Intermediary Attacks on the LLM Supply Chain
(arXiv:2604.08407), tested 428 relays: 17 exfiltrated injected AWS keys, 1
drained a real Ethereum private key, and 9 tampered with returned commands —
e.g. swapping a download link for a trojan, or rewriting pip install requests
into the typosquatted pip install reqeusts (an attacker-owned package). Over
6% misbehaved — and several triggered only after ~50 requests or only under an
agent's auto-execute (YOLO) mode, so a sandbox spot-check can't clear them.
agentfw sits between your agent and both. It's local — no account, no cloud —
and it sees the decoded request and response of every call, so it can strip your
secrets out before they reach the upstream (masking keeps the real values on
your machine) and run detectors over what comes back.
http://localhost:9877/wire/<agent>/... captures and decodes every model
call (Anthropic, OpenAI chat & responses, Codex) and MCP frame, normalizes
them into a common shape, and stores a local trace — so you can see exactly
which upstream (provider or relay) each agent is actually talking to.agentfw tells the planner from the
workers on the wire, exactly — the planner always carries the
orchestrator-only Agent tool; subagents never do — and routes only the
workers to a cheaper model. Verified 100% on 672 real calls; the planner is
never touched.agentfw understands Hermes, OpenClaw, and
Codex config formats and edits them format-preservingly (YAML / JSONC / TOML
AST, comments intact) with per-edit backups — the foundation for spotting and
repairing a setup a bad upgrade left unstartable.One-command repair of a broken agent setup; blocking (not just flagging) high-severity hits inline on the wire; detection of relay command/download tampering and typosquatted supply-chain packages; malicious-skill scanning; richer indirect-prompt-injection classification; data-exfiltration and tool-allowlist policies.
npm install -g @openguardrails/agentfw
# CLI agents — launch them through agentfw (this instance only, no global change):
agentfw claude # or: agentfw codex
agentfw claude --model claude-sonnet-4-6 -- -p "…" # route this dir to a model
# App / daemon agents — print setup steps, agentfw edits nothing:
agentfw claude-desktop # or: agentfw openclaw / agentfw hermes
agentfw model add # register the upstreams agentfw can route to
agentfw status # daemon + tap health
agentfw never rewrites an agent's shared config. CLI agents are launched with a
per-process override; app/daemon agents you point at the wire yourself. No
accounts, no telemetry, no cloud — your traffic and traces stay on your machine.
See PRIVACY.md and docs/cli.md.
You do not rewrite anything or adopt a framework. agentfw never edits an agent's shared config; how you connect depends on the agent's runtime form:
| Agent | Form | How to connect |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Code | CLI | agentfw claude — per-instance launch; subagent model routing (Dynamic Workflows) + per-route routing + detectors |
| Codex | CLI | agentfw codex — per-instance launch + per-route routing + detectors |
| Claude Desktop | App | agentfw claude-desktop — printed GUI setup steps |
| OpenClaw | Daemon | agentfw openclaw — point its model base URL at the wire |
| Hermes | Daemon | agentfw hermes — point its model base URL at the wire |
| Cursor / Gemini CLI | Manual | agentfw cursor / agentfw gemini — point the base URL at the wire |
agentfw runs as a single local daemon. It never phones home, sends no
telemetry, and forwards your agent's traffic only to the provider your agent
already calls — and nowhere else. The one sanctioned outbound call is a daily
version check against the public npm registry, which carries no data and is
disableable (updateCheck: false). The full contract is in
PRIVACY.md.
Free and open source (MIT), entirely. Built on a capture → decode → route → detect pipeline with per-upstream credential masking on top, tested against real Claude Code, Claude Desktop, OpenClaw, Codex, and Hermes traffic. Bug reports and PRs welcome.