by KbWen
Governance framework for AI coding agents. It runs them through a five-step workflow (plan, build, review, test, ship) where no step counts as done without evidence. Drop-in rules and guardrails for Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, and Antigravity, via AGENTS.md.
# Add to your Claude Code skills
git clone https://github.com/KbWen/agentic-osLast scanned: 7/26/2026
{
"issues": [
{
"file": ".agents/skills/doc-lookup/SKILL.md",
"line": 88,
"type": "prompt-injection",
"message": "Possible instruction-override phrase: \"ignore previous instructions\"",
"severity": "medium"
},
{
"file": "AGENTS.md",
"line": 22,
"type": "prompt-injection",
"message": "Possible instruction-override phrase: \"ignore previous instructions\"",
"severity": "medium"
}
],
"status": "PASSED",
"scannedAt": "2026-07-26T06:35:35.584Z",
"npmAuditRan": true,
"pipAuditRan": true,
"promptInjectionRan": true
}See how agentic-os compares with popular alternatives.
agentic-os is an open-source ai agents skill for AI coding assistants such as Claude Code, Codex CLI, and ChatGPT, built by KbWen. Governance framework for AI coding agents. It runs them through a five-step workflow (plan, build, review, test, ship) where no step counts as done without evidence. Drop-in rules and guardrails for Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, and Antigravity, via AGENTS.md. It has 218 GitHub stars.
Yes. agentic-os passed SkillsLLM's automated security scan — a dependency vulnerability audit plus prompt-injection heuristics — with no high-severity issues. You can read the full report in the Security Report section on this page.
Clone the repository with "git clone https://github.com/KbWen/agentic-os" and add it to your Claude Code skills directory (see the Installation section above).
agentic-os is primarily written in Python. It is open-source under KbWen on GitHub, so you can review or fork the full source.
Yes. SkillsLLM lists many other AI Agents skills you can browse and compare side by side. Open the AI Agents category from the badge at the top of this page, or use the Related Skills and comparison links further down to weigh agentic-os against similar tools.
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⚠️ Third-Party Software Notice
This skill is third-party open-source software developed and hosted independently on GitHub. SkillsLLM is an informational directory and does not control or maintain the underlying repository.
Any security checks, ratings, or warnings displayed by SkillsLLM are automated and limited in scope. They do not constitute a security certification or guarantee that the software is safe, error-free, or free from malicious code, vulnerabilities, compromised dependencies, or prompt-injection risks.
Review the source code, permissions, dependencies, and configuration before installing or running any third-party skill. Use is at your own risk. To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, SkillsLLM is not liable for losses arising from third-party software.
Automated security scan — not a certification.
The /bootstrap, /review, and /ship above are plain text prompts — your agent maps them to the workflow files in the repo, so they run the same in Cursor or Codex as in Claude Code.
Or run a gate yourself, no install — the credential scan that catches a leaked key before it reaches git history:
bash demo/run.sh # Windows (PowerShell): pwsh demo/run.ps1
An AI agent wrote this file and reported: "Done — config added."
----------------------------------------------------------------
DB_HOST=prod.internal
aws_access_key_id = AKIA****************
----------------------------------------------------------------
Without a gate, that commit lands and the key is in git history forever.
Agentic OS runs this before the commit is allowed:
$ scan_credentials.py config.env
CREDENTIAL PATTERN(S) DETECTED (values redacted):
config.env:2: aws-access-key-id
Rotate the exposed secret, remove it from the change, then retry.
Commit BLOCKED. The agent said "done"; the machine said no — and it
redacted the value instead of echoing your secret back at you.
Your agent can still cut a corner. What it can't do is get a leaked secret past the hook, or a failing test past CI, once they're on — those run whether it cooperates or not. Reviews are checked from the work trail the agent writes: a missing review record fails the local check, a faked one does not. The key above is generated at runtime and redacted on output, so the demo never stores a real secret.
Three parts work before you wire up anything:
scan_credentials.py scans the files you give it, a staged diff (--staged) or a commit range (--range), with redacted output — the demo above. Two lines from the installer's output make it your pre-commit hook./handoff writes a resume block, so the next session or agent picks up from the log instead of the chat.A rules file — Cursor Rules, a plain AGENTS.md — is a prompt the agent can ignore. Agentic OS keeps that discipline (plan before editing, no unasked-for refactors) and adds a layer the agent doesn't control. A fresh install runs nothing by itself; the installer ends by printing the commands that turn it on.
| Failure mode | What catches it | On after install? |
|---|---|---|
| A secret committed to history | scan_credentials.py (shown above) |
No. Enable the pre-commit hook (two lines) or add the scan to your CI |
| A phase skipped with no evidence | validate.sh reads the work trail and fails on a missing phase or evidence |
No. Run it yourself or in the pre-commit hook. Work logs are gitignored, so CI never sees them |
| "Tests pass" with no tests | Your CI running your real suite | Only where your CI runs your tests |
| Tests recorded as passing, then the code changed (or the run failed) | record_test_run.py runs the suite and records the exit code and a fingerprint of the code; /ship runs its check, and validate.sh fails while the log is active, if the latest run failed before a PASS receipt or the code changed after it |
No. Run your tests through it. It catches stale or failed runs, not a hand-typed Test run: line, a recorded command that is not your real suite, or a tree git cannot read (a WARN) |
| The agent ignores the workflow or a skill checklist | Nothing machine-side | Advisory, the same as a rules file |
The second row is the part a rules file can't reach: validate.sh parses each task's work log and fails if a required phase was skipped or its evidence is missing. That check runs where the work logs are: on your machine, by hand or in the opt-in pre-commit hook, which --no-verify can skip. Work logs are gitignored, so CI cannot run it. What a required CI job can enforce is the credential scan, your test suite, and validate.sh's structural checks of the framework files; mark those jobs required in branch protection. In this repo that floor is three required checks (Framework Validation, ShellCheck, Check Markdown Links); the security scanning jobs (credential scan, SAST, dependency audit) run on every PR but are not required merge checks unless you add them to branch protection. The Security badge above is this repo running the same credential and SAST gates on its own every push.
Agentic OS is the enforcement layer. A rules file or a skill pack tells your agent how to behave; this is the part that checks - a secret scan and your tests in your git hooks and CI, which don't take the agent's word, plus a local validator that fails when its work trail is missing a phase. Already have those? Keep them. This sits underneath and turns the discipline they ask for into a check that can fail your commit or your build.
Every task runs a gated workflow, and the rigor scales to the risk. Skip a phase and validate.sh fails — but a typo doesn't run the same gauntlet as a feature:
tiny-fix classify --> execute --> evidence --> done
quick-win bootstrap --> plan --> implement --> evidence --> ship
feature bootstrap --> spec --> plan --> implement --> review --> test --> ship
And the ship gate is not a formality:
ship attempt --> [ no review/test evidence ] --> BLOCKED
ship attempt --> [ evidence on record ] --> SHIPPED
The agent can still cut a corner. It just can't cut this one
past a check it doesn't control.
The full set of paths, by classification:
| Classification | Required phases |
|---|---|
| tiny-fix | Classify → Execute → Evidence → Done |
| quick-win | Bootstrap → Plan → Implement → Evidence → Ship |
| feature | Bootstrap → Spec → Plan → Implement → Review → Test → Handoff → Ship |
| hotfix | Bootstrap → Research → Plan → Implement → Review → Test → Ship |
| architecture-change | Bootstrap → ADR → Spec → Plan → Implement → Review → Test → Handoff → Ship |
| Machine-enforced backstops | Once enabled, the failure modes above are caught by your git hooks, |