by 7onez
CTI Expert — Cyber Threat Intelligence & OSINT analysis skill for Claude Code. 67+ commands, 35 techniques, no API keys required.
# Add to your Claude Code skills
git clone https://github.com/7onez/cti-expertGuides for using api integration skills like cti-expert.
Cyber threat intelligence and open-source intelligence skill. Turns Claude into a trained CTI/OSINT analyst. Generates precision search queries, interprets public data, builds case timelines, and delivers structured intelligence products — no API keys, no paid subscriptions.
Runs anywhere. Works in Claude Code (Desktop & CLI) and in OpenAI Codex / ChatGPT and other
AGENTS.md-aware agents — seeAGENTS.mdfor the cross-agent runtime contract. Throughout this file,$SKILL_DIR= the directory containing thisSKILL.md(Claude Code:~/.claude/skills/cti-expert; Codex/manual clone: the repo you are working in). Resolve it by locatingSKILL.md— never hard-assume~/.claude. Detect the OS once (Windows/macOS/Linux) and prefer uv for all Python — see §13 Tool Auto-Install Policy.
Collection method: agent-browser when available (JavaScript-heavy sites, infinite-scroll, screenshot evidence), with automatic fallback to web search / web fetch / direct URL fetch. Tool limitations are logged as collection gaps — never as case blockers.
# Full autonomous case — runs every applicable technique
/case target.com
# Guided flow for first-time investigators
/flow person
# Summary of what's been found so far
/brief
Append --yolo to any command to skip all interactive prompts and confirmations. The analyst makes every decision autonomously.
Every investigation follows four phases:
| Phase | What Happens |
|---|---|
| Acquire | Collect raw data — /sweep, /query, /username, /phone, /email-deep, /subdomain, /webpivot + /icp (domain/URL targets), /cn-corp · /iban · /hash-id on discovery |
| Enrich | Recursive pivot loop — the pivot orchestration engine treats every discovered identifier as a new seed and expands the graph hop-by-hop (/branch, /crossref, /link-subjects, /signatures) automatically until the frontier is exhausted, no approval prompts (autonomy=auto). Acquire↔Enrich iterate, not run once. |
| Assess | Score and verify — /exposure, /threat-model, /validate, /coverage, /verify-finding. Judgments carry likelihood terms, coverage gets the 5W1H pass, attributions get an ACH matrix (handbook/analytic-standards.md) |
| Deliver | Package output — /report, /brief, /render, /workspace save — auto-saves .md + .html + .json + .csv + IOC bundle |
Run /progress at any point to see which phase you're in and what's pending.
/caseand web-infra pivoting. For a domain or URL target,/caseincludes web-infrastructure pivoting (/webpivot) in the Acquire phase. It runs keyless by default (crt.sh + passive DNS + anonymous urlscan) and upgrades automatically when premium keys are set via/apikeys(Shodan/Censys/FOFA/DNSLytics/SecurityTrails/urlscan-PRO/WhoisXML). Because/webpivotcan fetch the target directly, for hostile infrastructure it prefers passive capture (urlscan/Wayback) — seetechniques/web-pivot.md. It is not run for username/phone/person targets.Archive IOC harvest runs by default too. For domain/URL targets the Acquire phase also runs
wayback_harvest.py <domain> --indicators(add--urlscanwhenURLSCAN_API_KEYis set), harvesting emails, phones, crypto wallets, tracking/verification IDs, SaaS-operator IDs, and socials from the entire Wayback history — not just the live page — with first-seen/last-seen per selector. It writes case-schemaindicators[]to<case>/raw/harvest.indicators.json, which merge into the case and flow into the auto-saved IOC bundle at Deliver. This is the step that recovers selectors a network later scrubbed — across the whole snapshot corpus, not just the live page. Passive by construction — only web.archive.org (+ urlscan.io if keyed), never the target.The five v2.6 commands are in the pipeline too — no flags.
/icpruns for every domain/URL/org target (and an IP's resolved hostname);/cn-corp,/ibanand/hash-idfire the moment a company name/USCC, payment detail, or hash appears — and all three feed their yields back into the recursive pivot loop as new seeds, so an ICP licence serial or a reused bank account expands the graph like any other node./redactis the exception: it is opt-in (--redact), because a redacted report is a weaker artifact and that should always be a deliberate choice. Full trigger table: §Technique Activation Matrix. Narrow with--no-cn.
Two layers, one skill: broad collector → deep pipeline. cti-expert is the broad collector — the wide net of Acquire/Enrich commands (
/webpivot,/sweep,/subdomain,/icp,/username,/email-deep,/breach-deep, …) that pull artifacts from anywhere. Theintel_engineengine is now vendored in-repo underintel_engine/(intel_engine/harness/,intel_engine/tools/,intel_engine/WebPivot/,intel_engine/IntelGraph|IntelReport|BinaryPivot|IntelAnalysis/) and supplies the pipeline chains + deeper pivoting logic: a persistent knowledge base (intel_engine/knowledge/), versioned cases (cases/), cross-case correlation, calibrated assessment, and rendering.The chain: broad collection (cti-expert) → the pipeline (
/pipeline,/harness) ingests it, then applies the deep logic — "seen this operator before?" (/recall), whole-KB clustering (/kb --cluster,/cert-overlap), false-positive control (/reference), risk scoring (/risk), hypothesis generation, confidence calibration, and a versionedAssessment. The pipeline drives cti-expert's ownscripts/webpivot/pivot_extract.pycollector, so the broad and deep layers share one artifact shape end-to-end.Self-contained & self-resolving.
/backendresolves to SELF (in-repo) — no external setup. Deps:uv venv && uv pip install -r requirements.txt(harness SDK/MCP + IntelGraph renderers; the collector + KB + deterministic pipeline are stdlib and need none). An explicit$INTEL_HOMEstill overrides for a shared external KB. Full architecture, the op map, and the evidence-envelope schema:connectors/intel-backend.md.
Two failure modes ruin a cluster: asserting a link that isn't there, and missing one that is. This section governs both. Apply it in Enrich, before anything reaches a report.
Work down this ladder. Never assert same-operator on a lower rung when a higher rung is available or contradicts it. Tag every asserted link in the report with the rung it rests on.
| Rung | Indicator | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Registrant email / phone / org — including historic WHOIS | decisive |
| 2 | One domain carrying two identities across its own WHOIS history | decisive — proves an alias |
| 3 | Site-verification token (Google Search Console, etc.) | decisive — proves account control |
| 4 | Shared TLS certificate / SAN cross-cover | strong |
| 5 | Nameserver delegation to a host the operator runs themselves | strong — proves zone control |
| 6 | APK signing certificate | strong |
| 7 | Distinctive favicon / analytics / tracker / backend tenant ID | moderate — verify below |
| 8 | Co-tenancy on a dedicated host (few tenants) | moderate |
| 9 | Site template / framework / kit | weak — kit-level, never operator-level |
| 10 | Co-tenancy on shared/reseller hosting; managed-provider nameservers | information, not a link |
Reverse-WHOIS is the highest-yield pivot here. Always mode=preview first — the count is
free. A term returning hundreds is shared boilerplate; do not purchase it.
Before any indicator becomes a cluster edge, run /reference check <value>. If it returns
UNKNOWN, decide and record it with /reference add so the next case inherits the judgement.
Six traps, all of which have produced real false clusters:
| Trap | Why it fools you | Test |
|---|---|---|
| Commodity site kit | A template sold to hundreds of unrelated fraud operators | Search the template path in urlscan/FOFA — a large population means kit-level |
| Privacy-proxy contacts | The registrar's boilerplate phone/email, shared by every customer of that service | Reverse-WHOIS it; a spread of unrelated domains means noise |
| Shared/reseller hosting IP | A 20+-tenant cPanel box links nothing | Count tenants before clustering |
| Managed-provider nameservers | Cloudflare/GoDaddy/Gandi/Wix NS are shared by millions | Self-hosted NS is rung 5; provider NS is rung 10 |
| Org-name collision | A registrant org string that also matches a real, unrelated company | Reverse-WHOIS the org; inspect what comes back before attributing |
| Shared analytics / tag container | Often one web developer reusing a container across unrelated clients | Check domain creation dates — a decade-old business sharing a tag with a new fraud domain is a third party |
Never put an unvalidated indicator into a report that recommends abuse reporting. Naming an uninvolved business is the most damaging error this skill can produce. When a cluster rests on a single rung-7-or-below indicator, label it candidate, single-indicator — not a cluster member.
/anyrun is lookup-only. It reads detonations that already happened; it has no submit path,
and the submission endpoint is deliberately absent from BinaryPivot/references/anyrun.json.
tests/test_no_sample_submission.py enforces that as a gate, so it cannot regress quietly.
Do not work around it. Uploading the case's own APK / installer / archive to ANY.RUN — or VirusTotal, or any public sandbox — is an outbound, irreversible act:
If detonation is genuinely necessary, stop and put it to the analyst in plain terms — what
becomes public, and that it is permanent — and let them do it themselves in the sandbox UI on a
private plan. Never as a side effect of a pivot, and never on standing permission inferred
from an earlier approval. The same reasoning governs --submit (urlscan/Wayback): a public
urlscan scan of a live scam funnel is visible to the operator too.
When a case yields a real person's name or a username, and you already hold a domain that
matters to the case, run /email-permute. An operator's mailbox is almost never published, but
it is usually derivable — mail hosts use a small set of local-part conventions, and the operator's
own domain is the highest-yield thing to permute against.
That value comes with a matching hazard, so this rule is absolute:
gmail.com is volume with no prior behind it — --free exists, is capped, and
should be a deliberate choice, not a reflex.kb_ingest becomes a shared indicator, and a shared indicator merges two
operator clusters. A permutator wired straight into correlation does not enrich a case — it
silently names an innocent party. This is the same failure RULE 5 exists to prevent.promote list — corroborated by independent evidence (Gravatar registration, breach
corpus, a GitHub commit, a page/DOM hit, a dork) — may be treated as a real email seed, and that
promotion is an analyst decision.RCPT TO probing connects to the target's mail server, which the
egress posture exists to prevent on a hostile case; and a catch-all domain answers 250 for
every address ever tried, so it manufactures confidence instead of measuring it. Use --verify,
which gates on MX (RFC 7505 null MX included) and checks Gravatar — both keyless, neither
touching the target.State the status in the turn. "12 candidates, 0 corroborated" is an honest result; presenting those 12 as discovered addresses is not.
Zero pivots, a parked page, or NXDOMAIN is not an answer. Run /fallback <domain> — crt.sh,
the full Wayback timeline, archive.today, and the local KB. A parked apex frequently has live
subdomains: enumerate CT and the Wayback CDX host histogram before writing a seed off. Report an
empty result as empty; a collector that returned nothing is a finding, not something to omit.
/cti <target> is the single entry to this skill. It routes any target type — domain, IP,
email, username, phone, wallet, hash, APK — through recall → collect → cluster → assess. Plain
English works identically ("analyze example.com and pivot the infrastructure"); the command form
just removes ambiguity.
Eight commands are registered with Claude Code by bash scripts/register.sh and work from a
cold prompt in any project:
| Command | Does | Equivalent T2 op | Equivalent T1 tool |
|---|---|---|---|
/cti <target> |
entry point — routes by target type | (whole chain) | (whole chain) |
/cti-recall <seed> |
seen before? run first, always | recall |
domain_verdict, which_cases |
/cti-case <ID> <seeds> |
full deterministic pipeline | pipeline open |
(none — CLI only) |
/cti-pivot <url|ip> |
collect one target | pivot-extract |
pivot_extract |
/cti-cluster <domain> |
correlate & expand | kb, cert-overlap |
kb_cluster, cert_overlap |
/cti-check <indicator> |
false-positive control | reference check |
reference_check, reference_add |
/cti-report <ID> |
render graph + PDF/DOCX | graph, report |
render_diagram, render_report |
/cti-status |
backend / MCP / credits health | backend.py status |
api_usage |
Every other
/commandin §3 is a convention read from this file, not a registered command. Once the skill is loaded they are unambiguous instructions; typed at a cold prompt they do nothing. When in doubt use/ctiand describe the goal.
Three layers, one operation. The same capability is reachable three ways and the names differ
by layer — T0 uses kebab-case after a slash, T2 uses kebab-case ops, T1 uses snake_case
tools. The table above is the canonical mapping; when you add a capability, add a row here in the
same commit or the layers drift apart again.
Capabilities that are not registered commands still carry their layer mapping inline in the §3
tables. The engine's WebPivot/BinaryPivot collectors add these: /capabilities (T2 capabilities,
T1 capability_check), /impersonate (T2 impersonate, T1 impersonation_hunt), /search-pivot
(T2 search-pivot, T1 search_pivot), /censys (T2 censys, T1 censys), /intelx
(T2 intelx, T1 intelx_search) and /anyrun (T2 anyrun, T1 anyrun_lookup).
Commands grouped by AEAD phase.
| Command | What It Does | Example |
|---|---|---|
/case [target] |
Full pipeline — runs every applicable technique | /case example.com |
/sweep [target] |
Multi-vector recon on any target type | /sweep @username |
/query [subject] |
Builds 12–15 advanced search operator queries | /query example.com |
/username [handle] |
Enumerate handle across 3000+ platforms | /username johndoe |
/phone [number] |
Carrier, line type, reputation, public associations | /phone +84901234567 |
/email-deep [email] |
Accounts, breach history, infrastructure | /email-deep u@domain.com |
/subdomain [domain] |
CT logs, brute-force, passive enumeration; flags admin/sensitive subdomains (admin,adm,kef,ador,panel…) per handbook/admin-endpoint-indicators.md |
/subdomain example.com |
/breach-deep [email] |
Multi-source breach lookup with context | /breach-deep u@domain.com |
/traffic [domain] |
Traffic estimation, ranking, audience data | /traffic example.com |
/visitors [domain] |
Full visitor intelligence: tech, geo, sources, analytics | /visitors example.com |
/techstack [domain] |
Technology fingerprint (CMS, analytics, CDN, server) | /techstack example.com |
/competitors [domain] |
Competitor & related site discovery | /competitors example.com |
/secrets [target] |
Exposed credentials in repos and paste sites | /secrets github.com/org |
/github-osint [target] |
GitHub user/org/repo recon: profiles, repos, code search, commits, forks | /github-osint github.com/org/repo |
/threat-check [target] |
IP/domain/URL/hash threat intelligence | /threat-check 185.1.1.1 |
/scam-check [domain] |
Phishing/scam/malicious domain check | /scam-check susp-site.xyz |
/webpivot [url] |
Web-infra pivoting — extract favicon mmh3 / GA-GTM-AdSense / wallet / SaaS-operator artifacts from a page's DOM → ranked pivot queries (Shodan/PublicWWW/urlscan/FOFA). Flags: --render, --crawl, --history (Wayback GA), --fetch (pull archived page content — WebFetch can't reach Wayback), --harvest (full-IOC harvest across whole archive history → emails/phones/wallets/IDs/socials), --whois, --graph (cluster), --rank (score same-operator relations), --cert (cert-fingerprint pivot), --suggest, --wallets, --paths. See techniques/web-pivot.md (reverse-lookup engines per artifact → handbook/pivot-services.md) |
/webpivot https://scam-site.top |
| (automatic — no flag) | Four layers now run on every collection and need no command. Asset layer: fetches the page's own JS bundles and re-runs every extractor over the source — the fix for SPA/white-label kits where the shell HTML is empty; yields off-apex api_endpoint/websocket_endpoint (the backend survives a front-end re-skin), build_env:<KEY> tenant tokens, js_bundle_sha256, and via sourceMappingURL the operator's own dev_username/dev_project. SPA route table: reads the app's router literals — spa_route:admin, spa_route:funnel, and a spa_route_signature that survives a re-skin. Zero extra requests, routes are leads only and are never fetched. Well-known/policy files: a fixed standards list (never a wordlist, no path brute-forcing) → adstxt_publisher, apple_team_id, security_contact. JARM: TLS-stack fingerprint of the server. Suppress with --no-assets / --no-well-known; cap fetches with --assets-max N |
(runs inside /cti-pivot) |
/capabilities |
Run this first, and again before reporting any "nothing found". Which optional API keys are configured, and for each absent one the evidence class that went unqueried plus the free path that substitutes. A keyless run extracts every artifact but cannot reverse most of them — so "no sibling domains" with no FOFA/urlscan key is a fact about the credentials, not about the operator. Every collection also records this in meta.capability; carry the limitation statement into the assessment and cap confidence accordingly. T2: capabilities · T1: capability_check |
/capabilities |
/impersonate [domain] |
Hunt lookalike / typosquat domains of a seed — typosquat permutations (omission, insertion, adjacent-key, transposition, homoglyph, hyphenation, combosquat) + a curated scam-heavy TLD sweep + a crt.sh keyword hunt, then existence-checked by live DNS. Output separates confirmed registered lookalikes (each an impersonation:candidate — run /cti-pivot on it and compare) from an unregistered monitoring watchlist. FREE (crt.sh + DNS); --fofa / --urlscan add the metered sweeps. Never live-fetches the lookalike infra. Tune the TLDs/affixes per campaign in intel_engine/WebPivot/references/impersonation.json. T2: impersonate · T1: impersonation_hunt |
/impersonate example.com |
/search-pivot [indicator] |
Multi-engine search-engine pivot — the general-web complement to FOFA/PublicWWW, which only see served HTML. Takes any indicator (domain, slogan, tracking ID, wallet, Telegram/Zalo handle) and emits ready-to-open, URL-encoded dork queries across Google/Yandex/DuckDuckGo/Bing/Brave. It does not scrape: fire the queries with WebSearch, or WebFetch the DuckDuckGo html URL, then feed new hosts back into /cti-pivot. FREE, no keys. T2: search-pivot · T1: search_pivot |
/search-pivot "distinctive slogan" |
/censys [mode] [value] |
Censys Platform — the server-side view FOFA/urlscan don't give. cert <sha256> returns every hostname on that exact leaf certificate (near-decisive cross-brand same-operator evidence, and it works on a free plan); host <ip>, webproperty <host> also free-plan. query <kind> <value> builds the CenQL offline and keyless; budget reports the balance. ⚠️ 100 credits/MONTH per account, no rollover — a lookup is 1, a search 5, and running the emitted CenQL in the web UI costs the same 5. Prefer handing the analyst the query over spending a search. Needs CENSYS_PAT. T2: censys · T1: censys |
/censys cert 1a2b3c… |
/intelx [selector] |
Intelligence X — search ONE strong selector across a corpus nothing else here indexes: breach dumps, infostealer logs, pastes, darknet mirrors, historical WHOIS. Takes an email / domain (*.apex wildcard ok) / URL / IP / phone / wallet / IBAN — never a brand or person name (soft terms are refused and still cost a unit; classify_selector() blocks them locally). --phonebook <domain> inventories every email, subdomain and URL under an apex — the highest-value call, PAID-only. Grading is not optional: a hit in a breach dump or stealer log is EXPOSURE, flagged NOT clusterable — two addresses in one combolist share victims, not an operator. Only whois / pastes / darknet hits may carry a same-operator edge. Keyless ≈ 50%: it still types the selector and hands you the intelx.io URL. T2: intelx · T1: intelx_search |
/intelx registrant@example.com |
/anyrun [indicator] |
ANY.RUN TI Lookup — READ-ONLY. What samples carrying this indicator did when other people detonated them: contacted domains/IPs/URLs/ports, family label, Suricata context, public task links. Run it after /binary on the sample's sha256, backend host or ip:port. It is the only way to recover a packed sample's real endpoints — those exist only at runtime, so a thin string sweep plus a binary:protection finding is exactly the cue. A shared family is same-KIT, never attribution on its own. Keyless ≈ 50%: composes the query + UI link. ⚠️ This tool never submits a sample — see the box below. T2: anyrun · T1: anyrun_lookup |
/anyrun <sha256> |
/cert-pivot [domain] |
Cert-fingerprint pivot — other hosts serving the same TLS cert + SAN siblings (keyless; Shodan/Censys with keys) | /cert-pivot scam-site.top |
/sensitive-paths [list] |
Classify a Wayback/URL list for exposed paths (.git/.env/backups/configs) — severity + per-year timeline | /sensitive-paths waymore_index.txt |
/email-hygiene [email] |
Grade an email domain 0–100 + A–F (disposable/MX/free/role) | /email-hygiene admin@site.top |
/vuln-check [query] |
CVE/vulnerability lookup (CIRCL + NVD) | /vuln-check CVE-2024-1234 or /vuln-check apache/httpd |
/ransomware-check [org] |
Check if org is a ransomware victim | /ransomware-check "Acme Corp" |
/stealer-log [folder] |
Triage an infostealer-log folder — stealer-family attribution, victim-vs-operator profiling, cross-log actor correlation, IOC extraction (raw passwords/cookies/autofill/history shown) | /stealer-log ./logs |
/gdoc [url] |
Extract metadata/owner from Google document | /gdoc https://docs.google.com/... |
/msftrecon [domain] |
M365/Azure tenant recon — tenant ID, federation, MDI, SharePoint | /msftrecon example.com |
/icp [domain|serial] |
ICP filing (工信部备案) → registered PRC entity + licence number; reverse the licence serial to sibling domains under the same filing (same-operator, HIGH). See techniques/china-recon.md |
/icp scam-site.top |
/cn-corp [name|USCC] |
PRC corporate registry chain — GSXT (ground truth) → TianYanCha/QCC/Aiqicha → 信用中国 blacklist → UBO; officers, shareholders, subsidiaries, revoked-status flags | /cn-corp 深圳市某某科技有限公司 |
/iban [value] |
Validate + decompose a bank account as a selector — mod-97 checksum, country, BBAN split, bank code, jurisdiction-mismatch signals. See techniques/fiat-payment-osint.md |
/iban GB29NWBK60161331926819 |
/hash-id [hash] |
Identify a hash's algorithm before lookup — separates file hashes from credential material (32 hex = MD5 or NTLM) so it routes to the right service | /hash-id 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 |
/appliance-scan [domain|ip] |
Fingerprint internet-facing edge/VPN appliances (Citrix/F5/Cisco/Ivanti/Forti/PAN/Exchange) + exposed services → CISA KEV/CVE mapping. Passive-first (Shodan InternetDB/Censys); feeds /vuln-check + /threat-model. See techniques/fx-edge-appliance-recon.md |
/appliance-scan vpn.example.com |
/saas-map [domain] |
Map SaaS tenancy + identity fabric — DNS-TXT tenancy tokens, non-Microsoft IdP fingerprint (Okta/Auth0/OneLogin/Ping/Keycloak/ADFS), unauth API/GraphQL/spec discovery. See techniques/fx-saas-identity-recon.md |
/saas-map example.com |
/sharelink [url] |
Extract sharer identity from share link | /sharelink https://vm.tiktok.com/ABC |
/binary [file|url] |
Built-in. Static IOC extraction from a scam/fraud binary (sideloaded APK, desktop trading .exe/.dmg, bundled .jar) via the in-repo BinaryPivot/ — signing-cert SHA-256, package name/permissions, embedded C2/backend hosts, Firebase/S3 tenants, wallets, Telegram/WhatsApp handles. Output is WebPivot-shaped → clusters the app with web infra in the shared KB. See connectors/intel-backend.md §7 |
/binary ./trader.apk |
| /dork-sweep [target] [--telegram\|--docs\|--filetype\|--all] [--after DATE] [--clean] | Zero-auth dork sweep: Telegram ecosystem, 18 doc-hosts, filetype families; 4-tier fallback cascade | /dork-sweep example.com --filetype |
| /docleak [target] [--platform list] [--severity high] | 18-platform document leak hunt with severity classification (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW) | /docleak "Acme Corp" |
| /dns-history [domain] | Historical DNS record changes (A, NS, MX) via passive DNS | /dns-history example.com |
| /cert-history [domain] | SSL/TLS certificate timeline from CT logs (crt.sh) | /cert-history example.com |
| /email-permute [name] [domain] | Generate email permutations from name + domain | /email-permute "John Smith" company.com |
| /proton-check [email] | Proton Mail account creation date via PGP key | /proton-check user@proton.me |
| /pgp-lookup [email] | PGP key search — creation date, UIDs, signatures | /pgp-lookup dev@example.com |
| /wifi [ssid] | WiFi SSID geolocation via Wigle.net | /wifi "HomeNetwork" |
| /wifi --bssid [mac] | Exact AP lookup by MAC address | /wifi --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF |
| /register [name] | Add a subject to the case workspace | /register JohnDoe |
| /snapshots [url] | List/fetch archived Wayback snapshots. Note: WebFetch is blocked from web.archive.org (robots.txt) — use scripts/webpivot/wayback_fetch.py to list captures and pull archived content. See analysis/archive-explorer.md | /snapshots example.com |
| Command | What It Does | Example |
|---|---|---|
/branch [data] |
Expand a discovered identifier laterally | /branch john@mail.com |
/pivot-suggest |
Rank "what to pivot on next" from findings — leet/variant/reuse/temporal/domain clusters | /pivot-suggest |
/email-permute [name|handle] |
Derive email candidates from a person name or username against case domains. VN/CN/KR family-name-first aware; folds diacritics Unicode won't. --verify = MX gate + Gravatar. Output is hypotheses — see the rule below |
/email-permute "Nguyen Van A" --domain example.com --verify |
/rank-relations |
Score + rank same-operator relations across analyzed pages (noise-filtered, clustered) | /rank-relations |
/crypto-balance [addr] |
On-chain balance + lifetime flow for a wallet, valued at spot | /crypto-balance 1A1z… |
/timeline [subject] |
Assemble dated event sequence | /timeline Company Inc |
/crossref |
Detect shared identifiers across subjects | /crossref |
/link-subjects [A] [B] |
Define a connection between two subjects | /link-subjects John Jane |
/show-connections |
Display all logged connections | /show-connections |
/show-trail [subject] |
Show the evidence chain for a subject | /show-trail JohnDoe |
/watch [subject] |
Add subject to active tracking list | /watch example.com |
/record-finding |
Log a finding with source and confidence | Paste data after command |
/show-findings |
List all recorded findings | /show-findings |
/graph |
Full ASCII subject relationship map | /graph |
/pathfind [A] [B] |
Discover connection path between subjects | /pathfind A B |
/diff [url] |
Diff archived versions of a URL | /diff example.com/page |
| Command | What It Does | Example |
|---|---|---|
/exposure [target] |
Composite exposure score (0–100) | /exposure domain.com |
/threat-model |
Build threat model from findings; every attribution claim carries an ACH matrix (competing hypotheses scored by inconsistency, runner-up named) per handbook/analytic-standards.md §3. Backend hook (Assess): if /backend is up, calibrate confidence on your own priors first — intel.py operators list + intel.py risk --case <id> + read knowledge/{calibration.jsonl,analyst_profile.md} — instead of scoring from scratch. See connectors/intel-backend.md §6 |
/threat-model |
/signatures |
Surface recurring behavioral patterns | /signatures |
/validate |
Quality audit — score 0–100 | /validate |
/coverage |
Coverage matrix with identified gaps — technique matrix plus the 5W1H substantive pass (Why/How unanswered blocks Deliver-ready) |
/coverage |
/verify-finding [id] |
Re-check a specific finding's sources | /verify-finding 12 |
/subject [name] |
View or create subject record | /subject JohnDoe |
/lookup [name] |
Retrieve a registered subject | /lookup JohnDoe |
/modify [name] |
Update a subject record | /modify JohnDoe |
/archive-subject [name] |
Remove subject from active tracking | /archive-subject JohnDoe |
/find [query] |
Search across all subjects | /find domain:example.com |
/show-trail [subject] |
Full evidence trail | /show-trail JohnDoe |
/blind-spots |
Prioritized investigation gap analysis | /blind-spots |
/source-check |
Batch source URL accessibility check | /source-check |
/drift [subject] |
Temporal risk score tracking | /drift example.com |
/clarify [finding] |
Plain-language finding explanation | /clarify fnd-003 |
| Command | What It Does | Example |
|---|---|---|
/report |
Full report — auto-saves .md + .html + .json + .csv + IOC bundle | /report |
/report html |
Interactive self-contained HTML report (primary deliverable) | /report html |
/report brief |
Single-page executive brief | /report brief |
/report json |
Raw data as JSON | /report json |
/report csv |
Spreadsheet-compatible export | /report csv |
/report docx |
Word document (rich charts/diagrams) — on request | /report docx |
/report legal |
Evidence-formatted for legal proceedings (adds DOCX/PDF) | /report legal |
/report journalist |
Source-citation-heavy format | /report journalist |
/brief |
Plain-language summary (non-technical) | /brief |
/render entities |
ASCII subject relationship diagram | /render entities |
/render timeline |
Chronological event chart | /render timeline |
/render risk |
Exposure heatmap | /render risk |
/render network |
Network topology of connections | /render network |
/stats |
Counts and coverage statistics | /stats |
/workspace save [name] |
Persist case state | /workspace save mycase |
/workspace open [name] |
Resume a saved case | /workspace open mycase |
/workspace list |
Show saved cases | /workspace list |
/workspace diff [a] [b] |
Diff two saved workspaces | /workspace diff case1 case2 |
/render threat-path |
ASCII attack path flow diagram | /render threat-path |
/render attack-surface |
ASCII attack surface exposure map | /render attack-surface |
/report ioc |
Export IOCs as STIX 2.1 or flat list | /report ioc --format stix |
/redact [file] |
Shareable variant of a report — stable numbered placeholders ([EMAIL_1]) + reversible JSON map; .md/.json/.csv. Opt-in — the default export set stays unredacted; request with /redact or --redact |
/redact REPORT.md |
| Command | What It Does | Example |
|---|---|---|
/flow [type] |
Guided step-by-step case workflow | /flow person |
/template list |
Browse pre-built case templates | /template list |
/template run [name] |
Run a pre-built template | /template run security-audit |
/novice |
Toggle simplified, low-jargon mode | /novice |
/terms |
OSINT term glossary | /terms |
/progress |
Current case phase and coverage | /progress |
/opsec |
OPSEC checklist for current task | /opsec |
/onboard |
Interactive first-time onboarding guide | /onboard |
/quality |
Investigation quality composite score | /quality |
| Command | What It Does | Example |
|---|---|---|
/apikeys |
Manage premium/pro API keys (Shodan, Censys, FOFA, SecurityTrails, DNSLytics, urlscan-PRO, WhoisXML, Hudson Rock, IntelX, GitHub, SerpAPI…) — status/set/unset/test/unlocks. Keys upgrade existing techniques (especially /webpivot); keyless/free stays the default. Stored chmod-600 in $SKILL_DIR/.env (gitignored), env-var override. See handbook/api-keys.md |
/apikeys set shodan <KEY> |
/backend |
Detect/report the optional persistent-intelligence backend and pick the tier — Tier 1 typed MCP (intel-harness) → Tier 2 CLI → Tier 3 stateless. Runs scripts/backend/backend.py to resolve $INTEL_HOME (env → .mcp.json → sibling dir → symlink) and print the tier line. All the backend commands below dispatch through scripts/backend/intel.py <op> at Tier 2 (or the typed MCP tool at Tier 1). intel.py list maps all ~39 engine ops (full CLI parity — CDN ranges, graph-build, hypothesize, calibration, evidence-report, case-store, cost, deterministic pipeline, …); intel.py mcp prints/writes the .mcp.json that enables Tier 1 ("the server"). See connectors/intel-backend.md |
/backend · /backend check |
/kb [query] |
Built-in. Query the shared knowledge base. T2: intel.py kb --stats/--entity <v>/--cluster <domain>/--shared --min N; intel.py operators list. T1: kb_entity/kb_cluster/kb_query_shared |
/kb --entity example.com |
/recall [seed] |
Built-in. "Have I seen this before?" — check a seed against every prior case before collecting. T1: which_cases/domain_verdict (typed MCP). T2: intel.py recall <seed> (query.py --entity; which_cases/domain_verdict are MCP-only). Surfaces known operators up front |
/recall scam-site.top |
/risk [case] |
Built-in. Score a case's hosts for NRD / bulletproof-hosting / money-trail red flags. T2: intel.py risk --case <id> (or --file <pivot.json>). T1: risk_signals |
/risk CASE-0001 |
/reverse-whois [email|name] |
Built-in. Reverse-WHOIS a registrant identity → only high-value pivots; refuses privacy/registrar terms, flags bulk resellers as noise. T2: intel.py reverse-whois --reverse-email <e> --search-type historic --json. T1: reverse_whois |
/reverse-whois owner@x.com |
/cert-overlap [d1 d2 …] |
Built-in. KB-aware TLS/SAN same-operator verdict (SHARED-CERT / SIBLING-OVERLAP / NO-CT-OVERLAP) across 2+ domains — corroborates a cluster at the TLS layer. Complements the keyless /cert-pivot. T2: intel.py cert-overlap a.com b.com. T1: cert_overlap |
/cert-overlap a.com b.com |
/reference [check|add|list] |
Built-in. Curated false-positive control ledger — is a fingerprint BENIGN (common logo/CDN → don't cluster), SIGNAL (distinctive, prior-case → pivot), or UNKNOWN. T2: intel.py reference check <value>. T1: reference_check/reference_add |
/reference check favicon:123 |
/pipeline [open|status] <case> <domains-file> |
Built-in. The deterministic chain (no LLM key) — the bread-and-butter handoff: broad collect (cti-expert's pivot_extract) → ingest → prior-overlap → risk → shared-cluster → ICD-203 assessment, persisted under cases/<case>/. Prints collector: cti-expert. T2: intel.py pipeline open <case> seeds.txt [--no-graph] |
/pipeline open case1 seeds.txt |
/harness [open|continue|status] |
Built-in. The LLM-driven whole-case orchestration (IntelHarness) — persistent, versioned, cross-case Collect→Correlate→Assess to convergence (needs the venv deps + an LLM key for continue). T2: intel.py harness open CASE-0001 <seeds…> · continue CASE-0001 --depth 4 · status [CASE-0001]. Persists to cases/; status needs no key |
/harness status CASE-0001 |
/graph --render |
Built-in. IntelGraph publication-quality render of a case graph → PNG/SVG (distinct from the ASCII /graph). T2: intel.py graph <case_graph.json> <out-stem> --legend. T1: render_diagram |
/graph --render case_graph.json out |
/report pdf |
Built-in. IntelReport pandoc render of an assessment .md → polished PDF/DOCX (editorial house style, cover/TOC/figures, VN-safe). Complements /report docx. T2: intel.py report <assessment.md> <out-stem> --pdf --docx. T1: render_report |
/report pdf assessment.md out |
Reference: engine/case-schema.json, engine/subject-registry.md
| Type | Emoji | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Person | 👤 | Full name, alias |
| Username | @ | Social handle |
| 📧 | Address, domain | |
| Domain | 🌐 | Site, subdomain |
| IP Address | 🖥 | IPv4, IPv6 |
| Organization | 🏢 | Company, group |
| Phone | 📱 | E.164 format |
| Location | 📍 | GPS, address |
| Asset | 📦 | Document, image |
| Event | 📅 | Dated occurrence |
| Device | 🖥️ | IoT device, server, workstation |
| Image | 🖼️ | Photograph, screenshot |
| Crypto Address | 💰 | Bitcoin, Ethereum wallet |
| Bank Account | 🏦 | IBAN, local account no., BIC |
| ICP Filing | 📋 | PRC licence serial (one registrant, many sites) |
| Custom | 🏷️ | User-defined entity type |
owns — domain, email, or asset ownership
uses — platform account or tool usage
works_at — employment or affiliation
linked_to — general association
alias — same identity, different handle
communicated_with — observed contact
| Score | Label | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | PRIMARY | Authoritative or official source |
| 4 | DERIVED | Confirmed by 2+ independent sources |
| 3 | CONFIRMED | Single reliable source, verified |
| 2 | ANECDOTAL | Reported but unverified |
| 1 | CONTESTED | Conflicting data exists |
Complements numeric trust scores with source-level grading. Trust score rates finding content; source reliability rates the source itself.
| Grade | Label | Typical Sources |
|---|---|---|
| A | Completely Reliable | Official registries, government records |
| B | Usually Reliable | Established outlets, corporate sources |
| C | Fairly Reliable | Known blogs, industry publications |
| D | Not Usually Reliable | Anonymous forums, unverified claims |
| E | Unreliable | Known disinformation, fabricated content |
| F | Cannot Be Judged | Insufficient information to assess |
| Level | Label | Use When |
|---|---|---|
| VERIFIED | Direct observation, primary source | |
| STRONG | Multiple corroborating sources | |
| MODERATE | Single reliable source | |
| WEAK | Circumstantial or inferred | |
| TENTATIVE | Analyst deduction only | |
| CHALLENGED | Contradicted by other findings |
The three scales above grade evidence. An analytic judgment built on that evidence — an attribution, a motive, a forecast — carries a probability-anchored likelihood term instead. Without an anchor, "MODERATE" routinely means a 30-point-different thing to writer and reader.
| Term | Band | Term | Band | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Almost no chance | 1–5% | Likely / probable | 55–80% | |
| Very unlikely | 5–20% | Very likely | 80–95% | |
| Unlikely | 20–45% | Almost certain | 95–99% | |
| Roughly even chance | 45–55% |
Likelihood and confidence are orthogonal — report both:
The operator is very likely based in Guangdong (moderate confidence — single registry record, unverified).
Never 0% or 100%. One term per judgment. Never attach a likelihood term to a directly
observed fact. findings[].confidence in the report JSON stays an integer describing
evidence quality — likelihood lives in the narrative.
Attribution claims additionally require an ACH matrix (competing hypotheses, scored by
inconsistency, runner-up named). Full rules — likelihood, the 5W1H coverage overlay, and ACH:
handbook/analytic-standards.md.
ALL visualization commands produce ASCII box-drawing art by default. This includes /graph, /render entities, /render network, /render timeline, /render risk, /pathfind, and /show-connections. Mermaid available only with explicit --mermaid flag.
Why ASCII-first: Universal terminal compatibility, renders correctly in .md and .docx exports, no external renderer dependency.
┌─────────────────────────────┐ owns ┌───────────────────────────┐
│ 👤 John Doe [3/5] │══════════▶│ 🌐 example.com [4/5] │
└─────────────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────┘
│ works_at │ hosted_on
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────┐
│ 🏢 Acme Corp [4/5] │ │ 🖥 203.0.113.10 [4/5] │
└─────────────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────┘
Connection arrows: ═══▶ owns · ───▶ confirmed · ···▶ inferred · ←─▶ bidirectional · ─·─▶ alias · ╌╌▶ works_at
Box styles: ┌──┐ confirmed · ┌ ─ ┐ unverified · ╔══╗ target
Badge: [n/5] trust score · emoji prefix = entity type
Reference: engine/finding-framework.md, engine/conflict-resolver.md
Every finding logged via /record-finding captures:
Source URL / method
Collection method (browser | search | fetch | manual)
Trust score (1–5)
Confidence level (VERIFIED → CHALLENGED)
Timestamp
Linked subjects
Conflict detection (engine/conflict-resolver.md): When two findings about the same subject contradict each other, the system flags a CONTESTED state. Both findings are preserved. Resolution options: accept one, mark both TENTATIVE, or log the conflict as its own finding.
Deviation detection (analysis/deviation-detector.md): Automatically flags behavioral anomalies — account creation gaps, platform presence inconsistencies, metadata mismatches.
Weight engine (analysis/weight-engine.md): Aggregates trust scores across findings to compute subject-level confidence.
Reference directory: techniques/
| File | Covers |
|---|---|
fx-metadata-parsing.md |
EXIF, email headers, document metadata analysis |
fx-image-verification.md |
Image authenticity and provenance workflow |
fx-breach-discovery.md |
Breach database methods and paste site search |
fx-geolocation.md |
GPS extraction, W3W, Plus Codes, MGRS, Street View |
fx-social-topology.md |
Social graph construction and topology |
fx-email-header-analysis.md |
Header analysis, SPF/DKIM, SMTP routing |
fx-document-forensics.md |
Document forensics and metadata extraction |
fx-http-fingerprint.md |
HTTP fingerprinting and server signature analysis |
fx-leak-monitoring.md |
Leak and breach monitoring, paste site search |
| fx-dork-sweep.md | Zero-auth Google/Bing dork sweeps — Telegram ecosystem, doc-hosts, filetype families + 4-tier fallback cascade (WebSearch → Bing → DDG → agent-browser) |
| fx-document-leak-hunt.md | 18-platform document leak discovery with severity classification, paywall handling, auto-snapshot |
| username-osint.md | 3000+ platform enumeration with pivot extraction |
| phone-osint.md | Carrier lookup, VoIP detection, spam databases, FreeCNAM CallerID, WhoCalld, USPhoneBook reverse lookup |
| email-osint.md | Full email investigation: accounts, breaches, infra, Proton API, PGP keys, permutation, manual reference tools |
| fx-dns-cert-history.md | Historical DNS records (passive DNS, A/NS/MX changes), SSL certificate timeline (crt.sh CT logs) |
| threat-intel.md | AbuseIPDB, GreyNoise, OTX, VirusTotal, URLScan.io, CIRCL CVE, NVD API, ransomware.live |
| web-traffic-analysis.md | SimilarWeb/Semrush estimation, audience data |
| secret-scanning.md | Credential/secret detection in repos and pastes |
| github-osint.md | GitHub user/org/repo profiling, code search, commit metadata, forks, collaboration networks |
| domain-advanced.md | Subfinder, Amass, CT log enumeration |
| social-media-platforms.md | Twitter/X Snowflake IDs, Discord, Strava, BlueSky, ShareTrace share link analysis |
| advanced-geolocation-techniques.md | Overpass Turbo, road sign analysis, reflected text |
| web-dns-forensics.md | Zone transfers, Tor lookups, GitHub, Telegram, WHOIS, Xeuledoc Google doc intel |
| fx-visitor-intelligence.md | Visitor stats, tech stack, geo, traffic sources, analytics/AdSense/advertising ID cross-domain linking, competitors |
| wifi-ssid-osint.md | WiFi SSID/BSSID geolocation via Wigle.net, encryption analysis, travel patterns |
| scam-check.md | Phishing/scam domain verification and detection |
| cloud-audit.md | Cloud infrastructure security (AWS/GCP/Azure): IAM, network, storage, compute, logging, secrets |
| microsoft-tenant-recon.md | M365/Azure tenant enumeration — federation, tenant ID, Azure AD config, MDI detection |
| china-recon.md | China/Sinophone layer — ICP filing → PRC entity + licence-serial sibling pivot, GSXT/信用中国/TianYanCha/QCC/Aiqicha registry chain, USCC validation, Quake/ZoomEye/FOFA cyberspace engines, Baidu dorking, CJK pinyin + Traditional variant generation, CN social platforms, access-reality gaps |
| fiat-payment-osint.md | Bank accounts as selectors — IBAN mod-97 validation + BBAN decomposition, BIC, VN/SEA non-IBAN rails (VietQR/NAPAS BIN), account-reuse pivot, mule-pattern signals |
| fx-edge-appliance-recon.md | Edge/VPN appliance fingerprint → CISA KEV/CVE catalog (Citrix/F5/Cisco/Ivanti/Forti/PAN/Exchange) + exposed-service port-risk matrix (Shodan InternetDB, passive-first) |
| fx-saas-identity-recon.md | SaaS tenancy + identity-fabric mapping — DNS-TXT tenancy tokens, IdP fingerprinting (Okta/Auth0/OneLogin/Ping/Keycloak/ADFS/Entra), unauthenticated API/GraphQL/OpenAPI-spec discovery |
| dependency-audit.md | Supply chain security: CVE audit, framework-specific vulns, typosquatting, CI/CD security |
| disk-forensics.md | Digital evidence analysis: image integrity, Sleuth Kit, file carving, artifact recovery, timeline |
| incident-triage.md | Security incident response: NIST 800-61 methodology, containment, evidence preservation, IOC extraction |
| owasp-audit.md | OWASP Top 10 (2021) source code audit with grep patterns and CWE references |
| prompt-injection-audit.md | AI/LLM security: prompt injection classes, agent/MCP security, permission boundary audit |
| stealer-log-analysis.md | Infostealer-log triage: family fingerprinting (RedLine/Vidar/StealC/Lumma/META/traffer), victim-vs-operator profiling, cross-log actor correlation, IOC + attribution extraction (uv run parser, raw artifacts shown) |
| agent-browser.md | Interactive browser collection & evidence capture via vercel-labs/agent-browser (CDP, accessibility-tree @eN snapshots, screenshots; primary interactive collector, complementary to Scrapling) |
Reference directory: workflows/
| Guide | Intended User | File |
|---|---|---|
| Journalist Source Verification | Journalists verifying claims | wf-journalist.md |
| HR Screening | HR professionals running background checks | wf-hr-screening.md |
| Cyber Threat Intelligence | Security analysts tracking adversaries | wf-threat-analyst.md |
| Private Investigator | Licensed PIs running person cases | wf-private-investigator.md |
Activate via /flow [type] — interactive guided prompts walk through each step.
Reference: output/reports/, connectors/
Whenever a collection command (/cti, /case, /sweep, /webpivot, /subdomain, or the
pipeline) returns one or more domains, the reply's first element — before any prose — is a
markdown table summarizing each domain, so the operator sees the yield at a glance in the
conversation. The §8 file exports are the durable record; this table is the live view and is
never skipped, even for a single domain.
| Domain | Resolves | Top pivots | Risk | Cluster / peers | Seen before |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
site-a.example |
✓ | favicon:123456789 · G-XXXXXXXXXX |
NRD, BPH | 3 peers | CASE-0001 (Operator A) |
site-b.example |
✓ | registrant@example.com |
— | 3 peers | new |
Columns: Resolves ✓/✗ (collector got a host); Top pivots the 1–3 highest-rung indicators
(§2.5 ladder) as kind:value; Risk the risk_signals flags (NRD / BPH / money-trail, or —);
Cluster / peers shared-indicator peer count from the KB; Seen before the prior case +
operator from /recall, or new. Keep to these columns — detail goes in the prose below. One row
per domain; for a large sweep show the top 20 by risk and note how many rows were omitted.
Every /report, /brief, and /case command MUST auto-save the default export set to disk at the end of delivery:
| # | Format | File | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Markdown | CTI-REPORT-[CASE-ID]-[YYYY-MM-DD].md |
Diffable, greppable source of truth; also the input to the HTML/DOCX generators |
| 2 | Interactive HTML | CTI-REPORT-[CASE-ID]-[YYYY-MM-DD].html |
Primary human-facing deliverable — self-contained, OFFLINE; charts + 2D entity graph + topology + timeline + indicator panel + search |
| 3 | JSON | CTI-REPORT-[CASE-ID]-[YYYY-MM-DD].json |
Structured case data (the report JSON below); feeds the generators and downstream tooling |
| 4 | CSV | CTI-REPORT-[CASE-ID]-[YYYY-MM-DD].csv |
Findings (and indicators, via the IOC export) for spreadsheets / SIEM lookups |
| 5 | IOC / selector bundle | IOC-[CASE-ID]-[YYYY-MM-DD].{stix.json,txt,csv} |
Comprehensive indicators & selectors — STIX 2.1 + flat + CSV |
Save location: Current working directory, or ./osint-reports/ subdirectory if it exists. |
The default set is unredacted — it is the analyst's working record. A shareable variant is
opt-in, never automatic, so nothing is ever quietly weakened. Request it with
/redact or /case … --redact:
S="$SKILL_DIR/scripts"; R="CTI-REPORT-[CASE-ID]-[YYYY-MM-DD]"
for f in md json csv; do
uv run "$S/redact.py" "$R.$f" -o "$R.redacted.$f" --map "$R.map.json"
done
One --map across all three files keeps a selector's placeholder identical everywhere.
Infrastructure (URL/domain/IP) stays visible even then — in a CTI report the actor's
infrastructure is the analysis, not incidental PII; add --all-types to cover it too.
Never ship the .map.json — it reverses the redaction.
--yolo: save the five-format default set with no prompt./report docx) or automatically for /report legal (evidentiary, where a fixed Word/PDF artifact is expected). HTML "Print → Save as PDF" covers most PDF needs for free./report json, /report csv, /report ioc.The HTML, JSON, CSV and IOC outputs all derive from one report JSON. Build it once, then run the generators below.
Step 1 — Build the report JSON file. The generators expect a SPECIFIC flat format (NOT the engine case-schema.json). You MUST construct the JSON matching this exact structure before calling the scripts. Reference: scripts/sample-cti-report-data.json.
{
"case": {
"id": "CTI-2026-001", // string, case identifier
"label": "Case Title", // string, human-readable name
"classification": "OPEN SOURCE", // string
"analyst": "AI-Assisted CTI", // string
"date": "2026-04-08", // ISO date
"subject": "target.com", // string, primary subject
"status": "active", // string
"exposure_score": 72 // integer 0-100 (optional, enables risk gauge)
},
"executive_summary": "Full paragraph summarizing investigation findings...",
"subjects": [
{
"id": "SUB-001", // string ID (not UUID)
"label": "target.com", // human-readable name — REQUIRED for display
"type": "domain", // lowercase: domain, person, ip, organization, email, username
"confidence": 95, // INTEGER 0-100 (not string like "VERIFIED")
"verified": true, // boolean
"aliases": ["alias1"], // string array
"first_seen": "2025-01-15", // ISO date string
"notes": "Primary domain" // string
}
],
"findings": [
{
"id": "FND-001", // string ID
"subject_id": "SUB-001", // links to subject
"type": "infrastructure", // credential, infrastructure, identity, exposure, behavioral, legal
"weight": "HIGH", // CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, INFO — drives severity colors
"description": "Full description of the finding...",
"source_url": "https://...",
"collected_at": "2026-04-08T10:00:00Z",
"confidence": 88, // INTEGER 0-100 (not string)
"tags": ["tag1", "tag2"]
}
],
"connections": [
{
"id": "CON-001",
"from_id": "SUB-001", // subject ID
"to_id": "SUB-002", // subject ID
"relationship": "owns", // string describing relationship
"strength": "confirmed" // confirmed, probable, possible
}
],
"timeline": [
{"date": "2025-01-15", "event": "Domain registered"}
],
"sources": [
{"name": "Source Name", "url": "https://...", "date": "2026-04-08"}
],
"intelligence_gaps": [
"Gap description string"
],
"recommendations": [
"Action item string"
],
"visitor_stats": { // optional — enables visitor intelligence charts
"domain": "target.com",
"monthly_visits": 150000,
"traffic_sources": {"direct": 42, "search": 28, "referral": 15, "social": 10, "paid": 5},
"top_countries": [{"country": "Vietnam", "share": 60}, {"country": "US", "share": 20}]
},
"caveats": ["Caveat string"] // optional — overrides default methodology notes
}
CRITICAL FORMAT RULES:
confidence on subjects and findings MUST be an integer (e.g., 85), NOT a string (e.g., "VERIFIED")findings MUST be a flat top-level array, NOT nested inside subjectslabel is REQUIRED on each subject (this is what displays in the report — not value or display_name)weight on findings drives severity coloring — use CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW/INFOrecommendations must be an array of strings (not objects with priority/action keys)executive_summary with a full paragraph — this is the most-read section of the reportOptional enrichment fields (backward-compatible — used by the HTML report & IOC export when present):
subjects[].role — actor | victim | infrastructure | associate | witness (drives the role chips and actor↔victim attribution; otherwise inferred from type/links)subjects[].selectors[] — contact/social points attached to a person/org: {type, value, platform, url} (e.g. a victim's phone, an actor's Telegram or LinkedIn) — surfaced in the Indicators panel and IOC exportindicators[] — analyst-curated indicators to force into the export verbatim: {type, value, category, role, confidence, source_url}Step 2 — Generate the interactive HTML report (PRIMARY human-facing deliverable). Self-contained, OFFLINE, zero toolchain to view — opens in any browser:
S="$SKILL_DIR/scripts" # $SKILL_DIR = dir containing SKILL.md
uv run "$S/generate-cti-html.py" "REPORT.json" "REPORT.html" # any OS, zero setup
# no uv installed: python3 "$S/generate-cti-html.py" "REPORT.json" "REPORT.html" (Windows: py …)
It injects the report JSON into cti-report-template.html and renders, entirely client-side and offline (no CDN, no network calls): KPI cards, an exposure gauge, a finding-type pie, severity bars, a draggable/zoomable 2D entity graph, infrastructure topology, an event timeline, and the comprehensive Indicators & Selectors panel (network IOCs + contacts + identities + social/messaging handles + wallets + actor↔victim attribution) — with global search, category menus, dark/light themes and a print-to-PDF stylesheet.
Step 3 — Generate the comprehensive IOC / selector bundle.
uv run "$S/generate-cti-iocs.py" "REPORT.json" "IOC-[CASE-ID]-[YYYY-MM-DD]" --format all
# single format: --format stix | flat | csv
Extracts EVERY indicator that profiles or can reach an actor/victim — network IOCs, emails/phones, usernames/names/aliases, social-media profiles, messaging handles, crypto wallets, and the attribution links between subjects. Full spec: techniques/ioc-export.md.
Step 4 — DOCX (on request, or automatically for /report legal). Word is no longer auto-generated by default. When the user asks for it (or for evidentiary reports), build it from the SAME report JSON + MD. The generators carry PEP 723 inline dependency metadata, so the simplest, most portable runner is uv run — it provisions the deps on the fly with zero venv/pip setup, identically on every OS. The generator is also self-healing: it forces UTF-8 output and auto-locates pandoc (including Windows %LOCALAPPDATA%\Pandoc), so no PYTHONUTF8 / PATH prelude is needed. Replace REPORT with CTI-REPORT-[CASE-ID]-[YYYY-MM-DD].
Preferred — uv run (any OS, any agent, zero setup):
S="$SKILL_DIR/scripts" # $SKILL_DIR = dir containing SKILL.md (Claude Code: ~/.claude/skills/cti-expert; Codex/clone: the repo)
# Primary: HYBRID — full narrative from MD + charts/diagrams from JSON (zero content loss)
uv run "$S/generate-cti-docx-hybrid.py" "REPORT.md" "REPORT.json" "REPORT.docx"
# Fallback 1: JSON-only (charts + structured data; no pandoc needed)
uv run "$S/generate-cti-docx.py" "REPORT.json" "REPORT.docx"
# Fallback 2: MD-only (styled narrative, no charts)
uv run "$S/generate-cti-docx-hybrid.py" "REPORT.md" "REPORT.docx"
Windows PowerShell: set
$S = "$env:USERPROFILE\.claude\skills\cti-expert\scripts"(Claude Code) or"<repo>\scripts"(Codex/clone), and use backslash paths.
Fallback — no uv installed. Use the OS interpreter; the script's ensure_deps() installs the libs on first run (via uv if present, else pip):
python3 "$S/generate-cti-docx-hybrid.py" "REPORT.md" "REPORT.json" "REPORT.docx"py "$S\generate-cti-docx-hybrid.py" "REPORT.md" "REPORT.json" "REPORT.docx" — the Store python3 stub will not run; use py or the venv pythonpandoc "REPORT.md" -o "REPORT.docx" --from markdown --to docx --standaloneHow the hybrid generator works:
The MD file is the primary content source. It carries the full narrative (detailed person profiles, infrastructure tables, wallet addresses, corporate structure, legal history, etc.). The JSON file provides structured data for visual elements (charts, diagrams, risk gauge). Using both together produces a complete report with zero content loss.
Rich hybrid DOCX includes: Cover page titled "CTI REPORT", table of contents, all narrative content from MD (every paragraph, table, list, code block), pie chart (finding types), bar chart (severity), risk gauge (exposure score), timeline chart, entity relationship diagram, network topology diagram, traffic/geo charts, CTI-themed styling (navy headings, styled tables), header/footer with classification and page numbers.
After saving, confirm all files to the user:
📄 Report saved (default export set):
→ CTI-REPORT-CASE001-2026-03-30.md
→ CTI-REPORT-CASE001-2026-03-30.html (interactive — open in any browser, fully offline)
→ CTI-REPORT-CASE001-2026-03-30.json
→ CTI-REPORT-CASE001-2026-03-30.csv
→ IOC-CASE001-2026-03-30.stix.json / .txt / .csv (indicators & selectors)
Need a Word (.docx) or PDF too? (PDF = open the .html and Print → Save as PDF)
| Format | Command | Audience |
|---|---|---|
| Interactive HTML | /report (default) · /report html |
Everyone — analysts to execs; the primary deliverable |
| Technical INTSUM | /report |
Analysts, security teams |
| Executive Brief | /report brief |
Decision-makers, management |
| Plain-Language Summary | /brief |
Non-technical stakeholders |
| Legal Evidence Format | /report legal |
Attorneys, compliance teams (auto-adds DOCX/PDF) |
| Journalist Format | /report journalist |
Reporters, media |
| JSON Export | /report json |
Downstream tools, pipelines |
| CSV Export | /report csv |
Spreadsheets, databases |
| IOC / selector bundle | /report ioc |
SIEM/TIP ingest, threat-intel sharing |
| Word document | /report docx |
Formal sharing (on request) |
Every narrative report auto-saves the default export set (.md + .html + .json + .csv + IOC bundle — see Mandatory File Export above). /report legal additionally produces DOCX/PDF. Machine-only subcommands (json, csv, ioc) emit their native format directly.
| Type | Command | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Subject relationship map | /render entities |
ASCII (default) — --mermaid for Mermaid |
| Chronological timeline | /render timeline |
ASCII Gantt |
| Exposure heatmap | /render risk |
ASCII |
| Network topology | /render network |
ASCII |
All visual outputs use ASCII box-drawing by default. Mermaid only on explicit --mermaid flag.
Diagram tradecraft: output/visuals/diagram-patterns.md — compile-check a Mermaid diagram before presenting it, and pick the right diagram type per CTI question (attack → sequence, lifecycle → state, handoffs → swimlane, infra → graph).
The interactive HTML report (default deliverable) renders all of these as live, explorable visuals — a draggable/zoomable 2D force-directed entity graph, infrastructure topology, an event timeline, and SVG charts (pie/bar/gauge/donut) — alongside the ASCII versions in the .md.
| Tool | File | What It Exports |
|---|---|---|
| Maltego | connectors/maltego-export.md |
GraphML entity graph |
| Obsidian | connectors/obsidian-setup.md |
Linked markdown notes |
| Notion | connectors/notion-schema.md |
Structured database |
| Intel backend | connectors/intel-backend.md |
Optional persistent KB + cross-case correlation via the intel_engine engine (MCP/CLI). Absent → stateless as normal. Enables /backend, /kb, /recall, /binary |
Reference: experience/skill-tiers.md, experience/layered-detail.md
| Tier | Command | What Changes |
|---|---|---|
| Novice | /novice |
Jargon removed, steps explained, glossary auto-linked |
| Practitioner | (default) | Standard output, moderate detail |
| Specialist | /novice off |
Full technical detail, raw findings, internal signals |
Switch tiers at any point — output adapts immediately.
experience/guided-flows/ contains step-by-step interactive flows:
person-investigation.md — Full guided person casedomain-reconnaissance.md — Guided domain sweepemail-investigation.md — Guided email tracingrapid-case.md — 10-minute abbreviated sweepActivate: /flow person · /flow domain · /flow email · /flow quick
experience/case-templates/ contains pre-built starting configurations:
due-diligence.md — Corporate partner vettingsecurity-audit.md — Organization exposure auditbackground-check.md — Individual background researchActivate: /template run [name]
This skill operates strictly within publicly available information.
Ethical reminders are issued automatically when the investigation approaches sensitive territory. Public data is not a license to cause harm.
Append --yolo to any command or activate at session start.
What changes:
/report and /brief generated without askingWhat stays the same:
/validate and /coverage run before final deliveryActivate per-command: /case target.com --yolo
Activate for session: /cti-expert --yolo
cti-expert/
├── SKILL.md This file
├── README.md User-facing overview
│
├── engine/ Case data model and state management
│ ├── case-schema.json Subject and finding data structures
│ ├── subject-registry.md How subjects are tracked and versioned
│ ├── finding-framework.md Finding lifecycle, trust scores, evidence chains
│ ├── pivot-orchestration.md Recursive spider-map pivot engine (BFS loop, edge matrix, gating)
│ ├── workspace-format.md Workspace serialization spec
│ ├── workspace-manager.md Save/open/list workspace logic
│ └── conflict-resolver.md CONTESTED finding resolution
│
├── analysis/ Pattern detection and intelligence engines
│ ├── deviation-detector.md Behavioral anomaly detection
│ ├── auto-branch-rules.md Automatic pivot trigger rules
│ ├── drift-monitor.md Subject state change tracking
│ ├── cross-reference-engine.md Shared identifier detection across subjects
│ ├── archive-explorer.md Wayback Machine integration and diff
│ ├── signature-catalog.md Behavioral pattern library
│ ├── exposure-model.md Exposure score calculation framework
│ ├── risk-trend-tracker.md Temporal risk score tracking (/drift)
│ ├── pattern-library.md Username, email, bot detection patterns
│ └── weight-engine.md Finding aggregation and confidence weighting
│
├── techniques/ Collection techniques and module specs
│ ├── fx-metadata-parsing.md EXIF, headers, document metadata
│ ├── fx-image-verification.md Image authenticity and provenance
│ ├── fx-breach-discovery.md Breach database and paste site methods
│ ├── fx-geolocation.md GPS, W3W, Plus Codes, Street View
│ ├── fx-social-topology.md Social graph construction and topology
│ ├── fx-email-header-analysis.md Header analysis, SPF/DKIM
│ ├── fx-document-forensics.md Document forensics and extraction
│ ├── fx-http-fingerprint.md HTTP fingerprinting and signatures
│ ├── fx-leak-monitoring.md Leak and breach monitoring
│ ├── username-osint.md Platform enumeration (3000+)
│ ├── phone-osint.md Phone carrier/VoIP/spam lookup
│ ├── email-osint.md Deep email investigation
│ ├── threat-intel.md Threat intelligence free lookups
│ ├── web-traffic-analysis.md Traffic estimation methods
│ ├── secret-scanning.md Credential/secret detection
│ ├── github-osint.md GitHub profiles, repos, code, commits, forks
│ ├── domain-advanced.md Subdomain enumeration methods
│ ├── social-media-platforms.md Platform-specific techniques
│ ├── advanced-geolocation-techniques.md Overpass Turbo, road signs, reflected text
│ ├── wifi-ssid-osint.md WiFi SSID/BSSID geolocation via Wigle.net
│ ├── web-dns-forensics.md DNS, GitHub, Telegram, WHOIS
│ ├── fx-visitor-intelligence.md Visitor stats, tech stack, geo analysis
│ ├── scam-check.md Phishing/scam domain verification
│ ├── cloud-audit.md Cloud infrastructure security audit
│ ├── microsoft-tenant-recon.md M365/Azure tenant enumeration
│ ├── china-recon.md ICP filings, PRC registries, CN cyberspace engines, CJK variants
│ ├── fiat-payment-osint.md IBAN/BIC/bank accounts as selectors, VN-SEA rails
│ ├── fx-edge-appliance-recon.md Edge/VPN appliance fingerprint → KEV/CVE catalog + port-risk matrix
│ ├── fx-saas-identity-recon.md SaaS tenancy + IdP fingerprint + API/GraphQL/spec discovery
│ ├── dependency-audit.md Supply chain security audit
│ ├── disk-forensics.md Digital evidence analysis
│ ├── incident-triage.md Security incident response
│ ├── owasp-audit.md OWASP Top 10 source code audit
│ ├── prompt-injection-audit.md AI/LLM security audit
│ ├── stealer-log-analysis.md Infostealer-log triage, actor attribution & IOC extraction
│ ├── agent-browser.md Interactive browser collection & evidence capture (vercel-labs/agent-browser)
│ └── ioc-export.md IOC export (STIX 2.1, flat list)
│
├── experience/ UX, tiers, and guided flows
│ ├── skill-tiers.md Novice/Practitioner/Specialist spec
│ ├── layered-detail.md Progressive disclosure rules
│ ├── guidance-system.md How guided flows work
│ ├── case-progress.md Progress tracking logic
│ ├── guided-flows/ Interactive step-by-step flows
│ │ ├── flow-person-lookup.md Person investigation guided flow
│ │ ├── flow-domain-sweep.md Domain reconnaissance guided flow
│ │ └── flow-image-check.md Image verification guided flow
│ ├── case-templates/ Pre-built case configurations
│ │ ├── tpl-index.md Template index and descriptions
│ │ ├── tpl-due-diligence.md Due diligence case template
│ │ ├── tpl-security-review.md Security audit case template
│ │ └── tpl-background-check.md Background check case template
│ ├── tutorial.md First-time onboarding guide (/onboard)
│ ├── feedback-system.md Investigation quality feedback loops
│ └── accessibility/ Glossary and accessibility settings
│ ├── glossary.md OSINT term glossary
│ └── accessible-mode.md Low-jargon mode settings
│
├── output/ Report and visualization specs
│ ├── reports/ Report format templates
│ │ ├── format-catalog.md Report format specifications
│ │ ├── leadership-brief-template.md Executive brief template
│ │ ├── export-specs.md Export format specifications
│ │ └── citation-guide.md Source citation standards
│ └── visuals/ Chart and visualization specs
│ ├── chart-templates.md Chart rendering templates
│ ├── ui-components.md UI component library
│ ├── render-engine.md ASCII render engine spec
│ ├── case-dashboard.md Dashboard layout spec
│ ├── attack-path-diagram.md Attack path flow visualization (/render threat-path)
│ └── attack-surface-map.md Attack surface exposure map (/render attack-surface)
│
├── scripts/ Cross-platform install + HTML / IOC / DOCX report generation
│ ├── platform-setup.md Cross-platform reference: OS detection, uv-first install matrix, gotchas
│ ├── install.ps1 Windows installer (uv-first: uv venv/pip/tool; winget + pip/pipx fallback)
│ ├── install.sh macOS/Linux/Git-Bash/WSL installer (uv-first; brew/apt + pip/pipx fallback)
│ ├── stealer_log_parse.py Infostealer-log analyzer — attribution, profiling, IOCs (PEP 723 / `uv run`, zero-dep)
│ ├── iban_analyze.py IBAN validate + decompose (ISO 13616/7064) → bank code, risk signals (PEP 723, zero-dep)
│ ├── redact.py Reversible PII redaction — stable placeholders + exportable map; md/json/csv (PEP 723, zero-dep)
│ ├── cti-report-template.html PRIMARY: interactive HTML report template — self-contained & OFFLINE (charts + 2D entity graph + topology + timeline + indicator panel + search; dark/light + print-to-PDF)
│ ├── generate-cti-html.py HTML report generator — injects the report JSON into the template (PEP 723 / `uv run`, zero-dep, self-heals UTF-8)
│ ├── generate-cti-iocs.py Comprehensive IOC/selector exporter → STIX 2.1 / flat / CSV (network IOCs + contacts + identities + social/messaging + wallets + attribution; PEP 723 / `uv run`, zero-dep)
│ ├── generate-cti-docx-hybrid.py Hybrid MD+JSON DOCX generator — on request / `/report legal` (PEP 723 / `uv run`; self-heals UTF-8 + pandoc)
│ ├── generate-cti-docx.py Fallback: JSON-only generator (PEP 723 / `uv run`)
│ ├── cti_docx_postprocess.py Post-processing: styling, chart injection, cover page
│ ├── cti_docx_charts.py Chart rendering (pie, bar, gauge, timeline, traffic, geo)
│ ├── cti_docx_diagrams.py Entity relationship + network topology diagrams
│ ├── cti_docx_sections.py Report section formatting (used by JSON-only generator)
│ ├── cti_docx_styles.py Document styling, colors, cover page, header/footer
│ ├── requirements.txt Python dependencies
│ └── sample-cti-report-data.json Example JSON report data
│
├── workflows/ Professional workflow guides
│ ├── wf-journalist.md
│ ├── wf-hr-screening.md
│ ├── wf-threat-analyst.md
│ └── wf-private-investigator.md
│
├── handbook/ Reference material
│ ├── operator-queries.md Search operator catalog
│ ├── quick-report.md Rapid reporting reference
│ ├── discovery-paths.md Per-target-type search paths
│ ├── report-template.md INTSUM format specification
│ ├── admin-endpoint-indicators.md Admin-panel / sensitive-endpoint detection vocab & rules
│ ├── analytic-standards.md Likelihood bands, 5W1H coverage overlay, ACH (competing hypotheses)
│ ├── pivot-artifacts.md Pivot-artifact catalog (favicon, trackers, wallets, certs…)
│ ├── pivot-services.md Reverse-lookup engines per artifact — hash algo, cost, API/key notes
│ ├── api-keys.md Premium/pro API key management and unlocks
│ └── tool-cascade-reference.md Tool priority and fallback chains
│
├── guides/ Worked case walkthroughs
│ └── walkthroughs/ Step-by-step investigation examples
│ ├── walkthrough-person-lookup.md
│ ├── walkthrough-domain-sweep.md
│ └── walkthrough-username-trace.md
│
├── validation/ Quality assurance
│ ├── coverage-matrix.md Investigation area coverage tracking
│ ├── quality-scoring.md Scoring methodology
│ └── verification-checklist.md Finding verification steps
│
└── connectors/ External tool integrations
├── maltego-export.md
├── obsidian-setup.md
└── notion-schema.md
Which techniques activate per target type in a /case run:
| Technique | Person | Domain | Org | Username | IP | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
/sweep |
✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
/query |
✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
/username |
✅ | — | ✅* | ✅ | — | — |
/email-deep |
✅ | — | ✅* | — | ✅ | — |
/phone |
✅ | — | ✅* | — | — | — |
/breach-deep (LeakCheck + HudsonRock) |
✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
/subdomain |
— | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
/traffic |
— | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
/threat-check |
— | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
/secrets |
— | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | — | — |
/github-osint |
✅* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅* | — |
/scam-check |
— | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
/branch |
✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
/gdoc |
— | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
/sharelink |
✅ | — | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | — |
| /dork-sweep | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅* |
| /docleak | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅* | — | — |
| Social media platforms | ✅ | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — |
| Metadata forensics | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Photo verification | ✅ | — | ✅* | ✅ | — | — |
| Network analysis | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| Advanced geolocation | ✅ | — | — | ✅ | — | — |
| Web & DNS forensics | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | ✅ | ✅ |
| /timeline | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| /exposure | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| /threat-model | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| /wifi (SSID/BSSID) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| Visitor intelligence | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| Cloud audit | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| MSFTRecon (M365/Azure tenant) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
| /icp (ICP filing → PRC entity) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| /cn-corp (PRC registry chain) | ✅* | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
| /iban (payment-rail selector) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | — |
| /hash-id (hash typing) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Dependency audit | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
| Disk forensics | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Incident triage | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| OWASP audit | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
| Prompt injection audit | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
| /snapshots | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| Archive IOC harvest (wayback_harvest.py) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
| /diff | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| /drift | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| /render threat-path | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| /render attack-surface | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| /blind-spots | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| /source-check | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| /report ioc | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| /report + /brief | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Shodan InternetDB (ports/tags/vulns) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| GreyNoise Community (noise/threat class) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| URLScan.io passive (scan history) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | — |
| Disposable email check (kickbox) | ✅ | — | ✅* | — | ✅ | — |
| URLhaus (malware URL hosting) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| ThreatFox (IOC/C2 lookup) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| MalwareBazaar (hash → malware family) | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| ipwho.is (geo + ASN + ISP) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | — | ✅ |
| DMARC/SPF/DKIM check (DNS) | — | ✅ | ✅ | — | ✅ | — |
✅* — runs for discovered key personnel within the organization
MalwareBazaar — reached via /hash [value], but only after /hash-id has typed the value
/caseFour fire automatically as part of the standard pipeline — no flag needed. /redact is
opt-in.
| Command | Fires | Phase |
|---|---|---|
/icp |
Unconditionally for every domain/URL/org target, and on an IP target's resolved hostname. One cheap passive lookup — and a missing filing on CN-hosted infrastructure is itself a finding, so there is no CN-nexus precondition. A discovered licence serial re-enters the pivot loop as its own node and reverse-searches to sibling domains (same operator, HIGH). | Acquire |
/cn-corp |
Automatically on any company name or USCC the case surfaces — from the ICP filing, WHOIS registrant org, page footer, or personnel discovery. Runs the GSXT → aggregator → 信用中国 chain; officers/shareholders/subsidiaries re-enter the loop as new nodes. | Acquire → Enrich |
/iban |
Automatically on any payment detail that surfaces — page DOM, Wayback harvest, victim statement, invoice, stealer log. Validation is arithmetic on a string, so it is free and touches nothing. Valid accounts become financial/iban IOCs; a checksum-invalid account on a payment page is logged as a behavioural finding instead. |
Acquire → Enrich |
/hash-id |
Automatically on every discovered hash, and always before /hash. Decides file hash (→ MalwareBazaar/VT) vs credential material (→ /breach-deep, never a public service). 64-hex is queued for both the cert-fingerprint and file-hash readings, since it is genuinely ambiguous. |
Acquire → Enrich |
/redact |
Opt-in, not automatic — pass --redact (or run /redact later). Emits REPORT.redacted.{md,json,csv} + REPORT.map.json alongside the unredacted set. A redacted report is a weaker artifact, so producing one stays a deliberate choice. |
Deliver |
Registries needing mainland egress (TianYanCha/QCC/Aiqicha) are logged as collection gaps,
never blockers (techniques/china-recon.md §7). Non-IBAN rails
(VN transfer, VietQR/NAPAS BIN, card BIN, e-wallet) follow
techniques/fiat-payment-osint.md §4.
Flags: --no-cn skips /icp+/cn-corp (both run by default). --redact adds the
redacted variant (off by default).
Recursive pivot orchestration (the spider-map). /case is not a one-pass collector —
it runs a recursive BFS pivot engine: every discovered identifier becomes a new seed,
and the relationship graph expands hop by hop until the frontier is exhausted or a
budget cap is hit. The state machine — identifier typing, dedup / cycle prevention,
per-node depth, the identifier→pivot edge matrix, confidence gating, and per-depth
checkpoints — is scripts/pivot_orchestrator.py; the full
spec is engine/pivot-orchestration.md. The orchestrator
plans and tracks; the agent executes each hop's technique commands and feeds results
back via --ingest.
posture=active (may fetch/scan targets; still passive-first for hostile
infra), reach=exhaustive (pivot till the frontier empties), autonomy=auto — the loop
runs to closure unattended, no per-depth approval prompts. Depth summaries are still
printed as they happen, so the expansion stays auditable. Safety caps: max_nodes=500,
max_depth=6.analysis/auto-branch-rules.md):
exact-match links (≥95% — shared GA ID / cert / favicon / registrant email, handle
exact-match) auto-pursue unbounded; HIGH/MEDIUM capped per type; LOW held unless
corroborated; PII (person/phone) auto-expands by default (hold with --authorization unconfirmed); visited
nodes and past-depth-cap nodes suppressed (loop-safe)./breach-deep,
/github-osint; a domain discovered from a person (high-confidence link) continues
via /webpivot+wayback_harvest+whois_enrich+cert_pivot+subdomains; a shared GA ID
reverse-pivots to sibling domains; a discovered document (.pdf/office) or image
(.jpg/.png) is itself a node — metadata/authorship→person/email/org and EXIF GPS +
reverse-image/face→person/domain (face matches held pending corroboration) — each new node
re-enters the loop./case <t> --passive|--passive-first, --reach balanced|focused,
--checkpoint (pause for approval after each depth level), --depth N, --budget N,
--authorization unconfirmed (re-hold PII), --no-cn; --redact opts in to the redacted variant.graph_build.py → interactive HTML force-graph + topology
Legacy one-hop note (still true, now a subset of the loop): if /sweep on a domain finds an
email, /email-deep and /breach-deep trigger on it automatically.
GitHub OSINT auto-fire in /case:
/github-osint on the org name, primary domain, discovered GitHub orgs/repos, and developer-platform hits from /query or /dork-sweep./github-osint directly when the handle has a GitHub profile or GitHub search hit./github-osint only after discovering a likely GitHub handle, commit email, repo author, or developer profile link./github-osint only after discovering commit attribution, GitHub noreply patterns, profile links, or repo references./secrets, /branch, /timeline, /crossref, /exposure, and final /report automatically.✅* dork coverage notes: /dork-sweep on IP runs against reverse-DNS hostname once resolved (graceful skip if no rDNS); /docleak on Username targets document-author/uploader fields on scribd, slideshare, academia.edu, researchgate.
Dork auto-fire matrix — every /case target type gains coverage:
/dork-sweep --telegram --docs + /docleak on full name/dork-sweep --filetype --docs + /docleak on domain + org name/dork-sweep --filetype --docs --telegram + /docleak on org + primary domain/dork-sweep --telegram --docs + /docleak (author-angle)/dork-sweep --telegram --docs on email + @domain/dork-sweep on rDNS-resolved hostname (skipped if no rDNS)Adaptive fan-out: discovered emails → Telegram dork; discovered personnel → /docleak; discovered subdomains → filetype dork; discovered usernames → Telegram + doc sweep; discovered IPs → rDNS → dork-sweep.
When /case or /sweep runs on a Domain or Org target, it inspects the MX record and SPF TXT record. If MX ends in protection.outlook.com OR SPF contains spf.protection.outlook.com, /msftrecon auto-fires as part of the Acquire phase. Results feed back into the subject registry as infrastructure findings (tenant ID, federation type, MDI presence) and into /exposure scoring.
/case pipeline walkthrough (M365-hosted Domain/Org): (a) standard DNS/WHOIS/subdomain/traffic/scam-check/breach-deep checks run first, (b) if M365 indicators present → /msftrecon fires automatically with no extra flag, (c) tenant ID discovered becomes a pivot for /branch in Enrich phase (search other domains under the same tenant). No user intervention required.
Parallel enrichment (3+ subjects): When Acquire discovers 3+ subjects, enrichment commands fan out in parallel via AgentFlow DAG orchestration. Each subject's enrichment runs independently, results merge with dedup before Assess phase. Disable with --sequential flag. See techniques/agentflow-enrichment.md.
| Range | Label | Action |
|---|---|---|
| 0–25 | Minimal | Passive monitoring sufficient |
| 26–50 | Moderate | Periodic review advised |
| 51–75 | Elevated | Address within 30 days |
| 76–100 | Critical | Immediate escalation required |
Primary interactive collector: agent-browser (vercel-labs) — a fast native-Rust CDP browser that returns accessibility-tree snapshots (@eN element refs) + screenshots; no API key for core automation; cross-platform; also an MCP server. Full how-to + per-command usage in techniques/agent-browser.md. It is complementary to Scrapling, not in conflict (different ecosystems — Rust binary via npm/brew/cargo vs Python via pip — each manages its own browser): use agent-browser to interact with and witness a page (logins, clicks, screenshots, JS render) and Scrapling to fetch and parse pages programmatically.
agent-browser first (agent-browser --version; load its guide via agent-browser skills get core; install per the auto-install policy if missing)agent-browser for: screenshot evidence, logins/interactive UI, JS-rendered/SPA pages, complex multi-step browser flows[browser] · [scrapling-dynamic] · [scrapling-stealth] · [scrapling-static] · [search] · [fetch] · [manual] · [whois-lib] · [whois-cli] · [whois-api]Before running any CLI tool, detect the OS, check whether the tool exists, and if not, install it automatically and silently using the method correct for that OS. This ensures zero-friction investigation on Windows, macOS, and Linux alike — the analyst never stalls on a missing dependency and never runs a Linux-only command on Windows.
Full cross-platform reference:
scripts/platform-setup.md— OS detection,$PY/shell conventions, package managers, the complete per-tool × per-OS install matrix, and known gotchas. Consult it whenever this summary is not enough.
Determine the OS before running anything, and cache it for the rest of the session. In Claude Code the environment block already reports it (e.g. Platform: win32 → Windows). Otherwise probe: PowerShell $IsWindows/$IsMacOS, or Bash uname -s (Darwin=macOS, Linux=Linux, MINGW*/MSYS*/CYGWIN*=Windows/Git Bash). Then fix these conventions:
| Windows | macOS / Linux | |
|---|---|---|
| Shell | PowerShell | Bash |
Python runner ($PY) |
uv run (preferred) · else venv …\.venv\Scripts\python.exe · else py |
uv run (preferred) · else venv …/.venv/bin/python3 · else python3 |
| "exists?" check | Get-Command <tool> -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue (or where.exe <tool>) |
command -v <tool> |
| System pkg manager | winget (→ choco/scoop) |
brew (macOS) · sudo apt/dnf/pacman (Linux) |
On Windows,
python3/pythonin the Bash tool is often a non-functional Microsoft Store stub. Prefer uv (it brings its own Python and sidesteps the stub); otherwise usepyvia PowerShell.
uv is the preferred way to install and run everything Python in this skill. It is a single fast, cross-platform tool that replaces pip, pipx, venv, and pyenv, manages its own Python (so the Windows Store-stub problem disappears), and resolves script dependencies on the fly. Using uv also collapses the per-OS split for Python tools — the same command works on Windows, macOS, and Linux.
uv --versionwinget install --id astral-sh.uv — or powershell -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex"curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh — or brew install uvpython -m pip install uvIf uv genuinely cannot be installed, fall back to the per-OS pip/pipx/venv path — nothing here hard-requires uv.
<$PY> -c "import <module>" for Python modules)platform-setup.md)[auto-installed] in the finding's collection method tagPython tools — uv, identical on every OS (the big win: no per-OS split). CLIs use uv tool; libraries go into the skill venv via uv pip. No-uv fallback in the last column.
| Python tool(s) | Install (any OS, uv) | No-uv fallback |
|---|---|---|
| CLIs — maigret, sherlock-project, holehe, h8mail, waymore, xeuledoc | uv tool install <pkg> |
pipx install <pkg> |
| Libraries — cloudscraper, oletools, whoisdomain, scrapling | uv pip install --python <venv> <pkg> |
<$PY> -m pip install <pkg> |
| Scrapling headless | uv tool install "scrapling[fetchers]" then scrapling install |
<$PY> -m pip install "scrapling[fetchers]" then scrapling install |
| AgentFlow | uv pip install --python <venv> --no-deps agentflow |
<$PY> -m pip install --no-deps agentflow |
| Git-only — theHarvester, msftrecon, blackbird, sharetrace | uv tool install "git+https://…/theHarvester.git" · uv pip install "git+https://…/msftrecon.git" · clone + uv pip install -r requirements.txt |
pipx install "git+https://…" · clone + <$PY> -m pip install -r requirements.txt |
| Run a generator script | uv run <script.py> ARGS (deps auto via inline metadata) |
<$PY> <script.py> ARGS |
<$PY> = py (Windows) / python3 (macOS/Linux), or the venv python. On PEP-668 Linux add --break-system-packages to the pip fallback.
System binaries — OS package manager (uv does not manage these):
| Tool(s) | Windows | macOS | Linux |
|---|---|---|---|
| git, gh, jq, exiftool, pandoc, poppler/pdfinfo, qpdf, whois | winget install <Id> |
brew install <pkg> |
sudo apt install -y <pkg> |
| Go toolchain | winget install GoLang.Go |
brew install go |
sudo apt install -y golang |
| mat2 (metadata strip) | n/a → exiftool -all= -overwrite_original <file> |
brew install mat2 |
sudo apt install -y mat2 |
| agent-browser (interactive browser) | npm i -g agent-browser or cargo install agent-browser → agent-browser install |
brew install agent-browser → agent-browser install |
npm i -g agent-browser (or cargo install) → agent-browser install |
Go tools (after Go is present — identical on all OSes): go install <module> for subfinder, amass, gau, gitleaks, httpx. PhoneInfoga and TruffleHog → GitHub release binary per OS/arch (go install rejects TruffleHog's module for its replace directives; the PyPI trufflehog is the abandoned v2 Python tool and does not accept v3 syntax). ASN → Git Bash/WSL bash <(curl -sL …/nitefood/asn/master/asn) on Windows, native bash on macOS/Linux, or RDAP/ipwho.is HTTP fallback.
The exact winget IDs, brew formulae, apt packages, uv commands, import names, and Go module paths for every tool are tabulated in scripts/platform-setup.md §5. To provision a fresh machine in one shot, run the bundled installer for the detected OS:
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "$env:USERPROFILE\.claude\skills\cti-expert\scripts\install.ps1"bash ~/.claude/skills/cti-expert/scripts/install.sh(both accept --headless/-Headless, --go/-Go, --all/-All)
uv tool install for CLIs, uv pip install for libraries, uv run for scripts. It behaves identically on every OS, so reach for it before per-OS pip/pipx. Fall back to <$PY> -m pip / pipx only when uv cannot be installed.apt on Windows or winget on Linux.go is missing, install it via the OS package manager (winget install GoLang.Go / brew install go / sudo apt install -y golang), or note the gap and fall back to the next tool in the cascade.sudo unless running as root.winget may prompt UAC; a freshly installed tool may not be on PATH until the shell is reopened (probe its install dir or restart the shell before declaring failure). The DOCX generator self-heals UTF-8 output and pandoc location — see platform-setup.md §6.requirements.txt with <$PY> -m pip install -r requirements.txt.Last scanned: 7/2/2026
{
"issues": [
{
"file": "AGENTS.md",
"line": 55,
"type": "remote-install",
"message": "Install command (remote install script piped to a shell — review the source before running): \"curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh\"",
"severity": "medium"
},
{
"file": "AGENTS.md",
"line": 11,
"type": "dangerous-command",
"message": "Dangerous command (writes to Claude config): \"> `~/.claude/\"",
"severity": "medium"
},
{
"file": "SKILL.md",
"line": 928,
"type": "remote-install",
"message": "Install command (remote install script piped to a shell — review the source before running): \"curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh\"",
"severity": "medium"
}
],
"status": "PASSED",
"scannedAt": "2026-07-02T07:31:43.229Z",
"npmAuditRan": true,
"pipAuditRan": true,
"promptInjectionRan": true
}Transform Claude into a trained intelligence analyst — 74+ commands, 49 techniques, zero API keys required for core functionality.
Built by Hieu Ngo • hieu.ngo@chongluadao.vn • chongluadao.vn
CTI Expert is built in the open. These organisations back the work — with data, tooling, and hard-won investigative tradecraft.
| Supporter | What they bring | In the toolkit |
|---|---|---|
| Rexxfield | Cybercrime investigation and victim-side casework since 2008 — the real-world tradecraft the case workflow and attribution standards are modelled on | Tradecraft & methodology |
| Hudson Rock | Infostealer-infection intelligence — which machines leaked which credentials, and when | /breach-deep · /stealer-log |
| ParanoidLab | Dark-web, Initial-Access-Broker and infostealer-log monitoring across forums, markets and private Telegram | Dark-web collection & review |
| ANY.RUN | Interactive malware sandbox + TI Lookup — sandbox-observed C2 and real endpoints from packed samples | /binary · /hash-id |
| ZETAlytics | Global passive DNS with rare geographic diversity — historical resolution and co-tenancy pivots | /webpivot · /cti-pivot |
| IntelX | Intelligence X — paste sites, leaks, darknet and phonebook selector search | /webpivot · /email-deep |
[!IMPORTANT] ANY.RUN is used read-only.
anyrun_lookupqueries TI Lookup for hashes that have already been detonated. This skill never submits a sample — a public sandbox task is world-readable and irreversible. That boundary is enforced by a regression test (tests/test_no_sample_submission.py), not just by convention.
Listing here reflects support for the project and does not imply affiliation, endorsement, or any verification of this tool by the organisations named. Integrations marked above are optional and key-gated — every core technique still runs with zero API keys. Always respect each provider's terms of service. The full list of open-source projects and free public-interest services this skill depends on is in Acknowledgments & Credits.
A Claude Code skill that transforms Claude into a trained cyber threat intelligence and open-source intelligence analyst. It runs structured intelligence collection using 74+ commands across 49 techniques — no API keys required for core functionality. To take full advantage, add your own free or paid API keys to the skill's .env — each is auto-detected and unlocks higher-tier access (e.g., Wigle, VirusTotal, URLScan.io, Shodan, Censys, SecurityTrails, WhoisXML).
[!TIP] Keyless by default, more powerful with your keys. Every core technique runs with zero API keys. Add any free or paid keys to
.env(or run/apikeys set <service> <KEY>) and the skill auto-detects them, unlocking higher-tier pivots: reverse favicon→host, passive DNS, certificate search, sibling-domain discovery. A missing or bad key never breaks a run — it just degrades to a note. Setup guide: handbook/api-keys.md.
[!TIP] One skill, two layers. cti-expert is the broad collector — the wide net (
/sweep,/webpivot,/subdomain,/username,/email-deep…). Built into the repo is a deep pipeline (intel_engine/) that turns raw collection into a real case: a persistent knowledge base, versioned cases, cross-case correlation, and calibrated assessment. The flow reads like a sentence — collect broadly → "seen this operator before?" → cluster → filter false positives → assess. No external setup: the backend resolves toSELF; install the deep-layer deps once withuv venv && uv pip install -r requirements.txt. Architecture: connectors/intel-backend.md.
Core Capability
Multi-vector reconnaissance on any target type — person, domain, organization, username, email, IP, WiFi — with automated finding validation, exposure scoring, and structured intelligence delivery.
AEAD Workflow
Acquire raw data → Enrich with pivot expansion → Assess findings → Deliver structured reports (interactive HTML + Markdown + JSON/CSV + IOC bundle; Word on request).
| INTSUM Report | Network Topology | Risk Assessment |
|---|---|---|
The release where the deep pipeline landed. v2.6 sharpened the collector. v2.7 makes cti-expert a two-layer system — a broad collector plus a built-in, self-contained intelligence pipeline with a persistent knowledge base — reachable from a cold pr
cti-expert is an open-source api integration skill for AI coding assistants such as Claude Code, Codex CLI, and ChatGPT, built by 7onez. CTI Expert — Cyber Threat Intelligence & OSINT analysis skill for Claude Code. 67+ commands, 35 techniques, no API keys required. It has 463 GitHub stars.
Yes. cti-expert passed SkillsLLM's automated security scan — a dependency vulnerability audit plus prompt-injection heuristics — with no high-severity issues. You can read the full report in the Security Report section on this page.
Clone the repository with "git clone https://github.com/7onez/cti-expert" and add it to your Claude Code skills directory (see the Installation section above). cti-expert ships a SKILL.md manifest, so compatible agents can discover and load it automatically.
cti-expert is primarily written in Python. It is open-source under 7onez on GitHub, so you can review or fork the full source.
Yes. SkillsLLM lists many other API Integration skills you can browse and compare side by side. Open the API Integration category from the badge at the top of this page, or use the Related Skills and comparison links further down to weigh cti-expert against similar tools.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!
Top skills in this category by stars