node9-proxy

node9 monitor              # press [2] for Report view
node9 report --period 7d   # CLI form, no TUI

Install

# macOS / Linux
brew tap node9-ai/node9 && brew install node9

# or via npm (any platform)
npm install -g node9-ai

node9 init       # auto-wires Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor, Codex, MCP servers
node9 doctor     # verify everything is wired correctly

Requires Node.js 18+.

Shields — curated rule packs

Each shield is a curated rule set for a service or domain. Enable only what you need.

| Shield | What it catches | Enable | | ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------- | | project-jail | Blocks reads of ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, .env, credentials via Bash and Read tool | node9 shield enable project-jail | | bash-safe | curl \| bash, rm -rf /, disk overwrite, eval of remote | node9 shield enable bash-safe | | postgres | DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, DROP COLUMN, DELETE without WHERE | node9 shield enable postgres | | mongodb | dropDatabase, drop(), deleteMany({}), index drops | node9 shield enable mongodb | | redis | FLUSHALL, FLUSHDB, CONFIG SET on a live server | node9 shield enable redis | | aws | S3 delete, EC2 terminate, IAM changes, RDS destroy | node9 shield enable aws | | k8s | namespace delete, helm uninstall, cluster role wipes | node9 shield enable k8s | | docker | system prune, volume prune, rm -f containers | node9 shield enable docker | | github | gh repo delete, remote branch deletion, settings changes | node9 shield enable github | | filesystem | chmod 777, writes under /etc/, /boot/, /usr/ | node9 shield enable filesystem | | mcp-tool-gating | unapproved MCP tools silently activating new capabilities | node9 shield enable mcp-tool-gating |

node9 shield list    # show all shields + status

Always on — no config needed

• Git — catches git push --force, git reset --hard, git clean -fd
• SQL — catches DELETE / UPDATE without WHERE, DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE
• Shell — catches curl | bash, unauthorized sudo
• DLP — flags AWS keys, GitHub tokens, Stripe keys, PEM private keys in any tool argument, file contents, or shell config (~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc)
• Response DLP — background scanner reads Claude's conversation history and alerts you if Claude wrote a secret in its response text
• Auto-undo — git snapshot before every AI file edit → node9 undo to revert
• Skills pinning — SHA-256 verification of installed Claude skills / plugins between sessions

MCP gateway

Wrap any MCP server transparently. The agent sees the same server — Node9 intercepts every tool call.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "postgres": {
      "command": "node9",
      "args": ["mcp", "--upstream", "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres postgresql://..."]
    }
  }
}

Or just run node9 init — it wraps your existing MCP servers automatically.

MCP servers can change their tool definitions between sessions. A compromised or malicious server could silently add, remove, or modify tools after you first trusted it — a rug pull attack.

Node9 pins tool definitions on first use:

1. First connection — gateway records a SHA-256 hash of every tool's name, description, and schema
2. Subsequent connections — hash is compared; if tools changed, the session is quarantined and every tool call is blocked until a human reviews and approves the change
3. Corrupt pin state — fails closed (blocks), never silently re-trusts

node9 mcp pin list                # show all pinned servers and hashes
node9 mcp pin update <serverKey>  # remove pin, re-pin on next connection
node9 mcp pin reset               # clear all pins

Other commands

Beyond the three flow commands above (scan / monitor / report):

| Command | What it shows | When to use | | ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------- | | node9 blast | What an AI agent can reach right now — files, creds, env | First thing to run on any machine | | node9 tail | Live stream of every tool call (text-only, no TUI) | Piping into other tools, CI, logs | | node9 sessions | Session history with prompt, tool trace, cost, snapshot | Reviewing a handoff or past work | | node9 dlp | Credential-leak findings in Claude response text | Any time a DLP desktop alert fires | | node9 mask | Redact plaintext secrets from local session history files | After a DLP finding — cleans local disk |

Plus a live HUD in your Claude Code statusline:

🛡 node9 | standard | [bash-safe] | ✅ 12 allowed  🛑 2 blocked  🚨 0 dlp | ~$0.43
📊 claude-opus-4-7 | ctx [████████░░░] 54% | 5h [██░░░░░░░░] 12% | 7d [█░░░░░░░] 7%
🗂 2 CLAUDE.md | 8 rules | 3 MCPs | 4 hooks

Reading the data — what the numbers mean

Node9 surfaces the signal. Here are the patterns worth knowing:

| Signal | Likely meaning | | ---------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Would have blocked ≥ 5 in a week | Agent is attempting high-impact ops; shields are worth reviewing | | Single review-git-push rule >50% of findings | Your own rule is firing as intended — not a risk, just supervision | | DLP finding in user-prompt tool | You pasted a secret into your own prompt — rotate the key | | Agent Loop ×50+ on same file | Agent stuck in edit/test/fix cycle — check context or slow down | | MCP tool pin mismatch | Server changed its tools — review before re-trusting | | Large MCP response warning | That server is inflating your context window for every subsequent turn | | Response DLP alert | Claude